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I. Introduction 
The present article reviews the state of expectation-states theories 
as of the first of June, 1983. We have earlier reviewed the state of the 
theory of status characteristics and expectation states and its applications 
(Berger et al., 1980), and E. G. Cohen has reviewed interventions based on 
it (E. G. Cohen, 1982); but we have published no overall view of the state 
of expectation-states theories since 1974 (Berger et al., 1974). Status 
characteristics theory is only one branch of expectation-states theories, 
hence to confine a review of expectation-states theories to this one branch 
is both incomplete and misleading. "Expectation-states theory," as it is 
often called (even by us), is not~ theory. Rather, it is a family of 
interrelated theories. Our purpose in the present article is to review the 
family as a whole. 
Expectation-states theories are not a "paradigm" either (Kuhn, 1962; 
1970). That is, they do not constitute an all-embracing strategy of 
research and theory construction orienting the entire field of sociology 
or social psychology. They do not define what the problems of the field 
as a whole should be, how to approach them, or how to assess solutions to 
them. Rather, as a unit they lie somewhere between a theory and a paradigm, 
close to what Lakotos has called a "theoretical research program" (Lakotos, 
1968, 1970). 
Because this level of analysis of theoretical and research activity 
is somewhat unfamiliar, we devote some attention in part II of this paper 
to identifying the elements of such a "program" and how they are related 
to each other. Then, in part III we review the initial formulation of 
expectation-states theory: the phenomenon with which it was initially 
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concerned, how it explained this phenomenon, and subsequent research based 
on this original theory. Part IV goes on to review offshoots proliferatin~ 
from this original theory, including a theory of status characteristics, 
a theory of sources of self-evaluation, and a theory of justice. These are 
in all cases relatively early proliferations that are by now well-
established branches of the program. Before turning to more recent 
offshoots of the program, we pause in part V to identify the substantive, 
methodological, and metatheoretical elements that these earlier branches 
have in common, which we refer to as the "core" of the program. Finally, 
in part VI we describe four of the more recent proliferations of the 
program, including a theory of personality characteristics, a theory of 
reward expectations, a theory of moral characteristics, and approaches to 
a theory (not yet formulated) of status cues. 
II. Expectation-States Theories as a Theoretical Research Program 
"Expectation-states theory" is not a "theory" in the usual textbook 
sense of the term. On the other hand, neither is it a "paradigm" in Kuhn's 
sense. A "theory" is usually defined as a set of systematically interrelated 
concepts and propositions that are general and have empirical import. Berger 
and Conner's theory of the power-prestige process (Berger and Conner, 1969, 
1974) or Berger et al.'s theory of status characteristics and 
expectation states (Berger et al., 1966, 1972) are theories in this sense. 
But "expectation-states theory" is not.§. theory, it is a family of 
interrelated theories. It includes both the power-prestige and the status 
characteristics theories together with a number of other theories as well. 
It is therefore better described as a "theoretical research program" (cf. 
Lakatos, 1968, 1970), rather than a theory. 
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A theoretical research program consists of an interrelated set of 
theories (together with theoretical research relevant to these theories and 
applied research grounded in them). This larger "fa'llily" of theories is 
not a "paradigm" in Kuhn's sense because its domain is much more limited. 
As everyone by now knows, "paradigm" is a word with a large number of 
meanings (see Masterman, 1970), including everything from concrete exemplars 
(like Durkheim's Suicide) to what Gouldner has called the nonempirical 
"background" assumptions of any theory (Gouldner, 1970, pp. 29-35) or what 
Berger and others have called the "orienting strategy" that guide the 
construction of theories (see Homans, 1967, and Zelditch, 1979). Indeed, 
Kuhn tends to cover all kinds of scientific activity by the term, failing 
to distinguish materially different levels and kinds of theoretical 
activity. The chief defect of treating all kinds of scientific activity 
as a single, seamless web is that it attributes to all science the 
properties of theoretical strategies. An orienting strategy is a set of 
interrelated concepts, directives, and values that guide investigators in 
identifying problems, formulating solutions and assessing results. They 
are presupposed by any inquiry, but are for the most part nonempirical in 
character and relatively incorrigible. They define what the subject matter 
of a discipline is, how to conceptualize its basic elements, prescribe how 
to reason about these elements, and from these features they derive a 
heuristic set of problematic features of the empirical world. They define 
what the goals of inquiry are, they presuppose what there is and how we know 
what there is, they legislate criteria of assessment, and from all these 
elements they derive a set of methods of observation and inference. All 
these features of a strategy involve, at~ point, one or more ultimate 
values (for example, if one wishes value-free inquiry one must nevertheless 
come to terms with the fact that value-neutrality is an ultimate value and 
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one not "provable" by reference to any empirical inquiry;) lienee, though 
they do change with time--with evidence of their fertility and Hith a number 
of extra-theoretical (cultural and political) factors--they are relatively 
speaking incorrigible, conflicts among strategies are usually 
irreconcilable, and change, when it does occur, tends to be discontinuous--
i.e., nonctunulative in character. Thus, H is not to strategies that one 
looks to observe "growth" of theory. 
Lakatos (19G8, 1970) has suggested that the proper unit for analysis of 
"growth" in fact lies someHhere between theories and paradigms at a level 
which he calls "theoretical research progra-ns." Berger et al. ( 1974) 
have slightly redefined his concept in describing "expectation-states 
theory." For the present, a "theoretical research program" may be defined 
as a set of theories, theoretical research and applied research such that 
(1) the theories share some (not all) common concepts and assumptions, some 
metatheoretical elements, and some methods of observation and inference, 
(2) the theoretical research is relevant to the theories of the program, 
and (3) the applied research is grounded in the theories of the program. 
Relative to paradir,ms such programs are in much closer touch with an 
empirical Horld. They consist not only of strategies for 8pproaching the 
Horld but also of research that is oriented to testing, refining, extending 
and otherwise modifying theories. (By contrast, in Kuhn "normal science" 
typically invol'les filling in gaps; very little modification of theory 
occurs without large-scale revolutions in thought.) And they are in touch 
not only with "theoretical" research, i.e., research with a generalizing 
orientation; they also involve "applied" research, research concerned with 
identifying instances to which the theories of the program apply and to 
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testing implications of the theory for interventions that modify the Horld 
of empirical society. They·typically also differ from paradigms in being 
highly eclectic, that is in being a mixture of elements that are not 
typically associated at the paradigm level. Expectation-states theory, for 
example, might well be described as a mix of elements of symbolic 
interactionism, Heiderian and Lewinian social psychology, behavioral 
sociology, and even the theory of action. 
Relative to theories such programs are dynamic rather than static. 
The most important thing about them is that they grow. They grow primarily 
through both elaboration and proliferation. Elaboration involves the 
reformulation of a theory: for example, the earliest theory of status 
characteristics focussed on just one status characteristic and was later 
displaced by a more general theory dealing with multiple status 
characteristic (Berger and Fisek, 1974). Proliferation involves a shift 
in the domain of a theory: for example, status characteristics theory 
itself grew out of an earlier theory concerned with the emergence of power 
and prestige in initially undifferentiated groups. It arose by extending 
some of the concepts and propositions of this earlier theory to a body of 
(quite distinct) research dealing ;1ith groups initially differentiated in 
terms of status. The status characteristics theory explains a different 
set of phenomena than the original power-prestige theory and is in this 
sense a theory "of the same kind" only because both theories deploy ~ 
of the same concepts, assumptions, metatheoretical elements, and methods. 
One important difference between elaboration and proliferation is that in 
the former case one theory "advances over" and hence displaces an earlier 
theory whereas in the latter two or more distinct theories may continue to 
exist, side by side. The two kinds of growth, taken together, give rise 
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to a theoretical structure that looks something like a growing tree. The 
earliest formulation continues to grmv and change, through elaboration, but 
later theories also prolifer~te from this growing body of work like so many 
branches off the trunk of the tree. A look at where "the theory" is at any 
given moment calls for a look at the whole shape of the tree, rather than 
one or another of its branches. 
In describing the shape of this tree we divide the materials into four 
sections. In section III we describe the elaboration of the original branch 
of expectation-states theory, a theory concerned with the emergence and 
maintenance of power-prestige orders in initially undifferentiated groups. 
Section IV describes the three earliest, best-established proliferants of 
this original branch: First, a theory of the emergence of power-prestige 
orders in groups initially differentiated in terms of status; second, a 
theory of the sources of self-evaluation; and third, a theory of the 
"justice" of reward allocations. Section V marks a pause the purpose of 
which is to characterize the elements common to all four of these branches, 
hence its core or basic conceptual, metatheoretical, and methodologi'cal 
elements. In section VI we return to describing the branches of the tree, 
focussing on four of the more recent proliferants arranged according to 
stage of development. These include research on personal, as distinct from 
status, characteristics; research on moral characteristics; research on 
reward expectations; and, finally, research on task and status cues. 
III. Expectations and the Power and Prestige Order 
The original concern of expectation states theory was with the 
emergence and maintenance of differences in power and prestige in small, 
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problem-solving groups. These processes HerP. most evident in Bales' 
observations of small, informal, task-oriented groups >hose members Here 
pres~~ably initially equal in status. (See·Bales et al., 1951; Bales, 1953; 
Bales and Slater, 1955; Heinicke and Bales, 1953.) Bales found that 
inequalities in participation, and influence, regularly emerged in such 
groups. Once emerged, these inequalities Here highly stable. And, with 
the possible exception of sociometric ranl<ings, the various kinds of 
inequalities studied by Bales Here highly intercorreliJted. Research by 
others (most notably Harvey, 19'53; Sherif et al., 1955; '.-.'hyte, 191·13), 
demonstrated that established inequalities in poHer and prestige Here also 
correlated ;,ith member's evaluations of specific units of performance. 
Independent of actual performance, "higher status" members ;,ere typically 
seen as performing better than "loHer status" members. 
Because they are so highly intercorrelated, we can conceptualize the 
behavioral inequalities observed by Bales et al., as the components of a 
unidimensional power-prestige order. This observable power and prestige 
order consists in (a) chances to contribute to the solution of the group's 
problem (action opportunities); (b) attempts to solve the group's 
problem (performance outputs); (c) communicated evaluations of such 
problem-solving attempts (reHard actions), and (d) the exercise of 
influence (an individual changes his or her initial opinion after exposure 
to disagreement). These inequalities collectively are referred to as the 
observ<Jble power and prestige order of the group. 
Berger (1958, 1960) and Berger and Conner (1Q69) were concerned with 
explaining the conditions under Hhich inequalities in the observable po;1er 
and prestige order emerge, and in explaining the fact that its components 
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are intercorrelated. Although results like Bales' had been found under a 
variety of circumstances, they seemed most likely to occur under the 
following conditions: First, when a group is 90mzni tted to solving a problem 
the outcome of which is valued (i.e., a task in 1mich members can 
distinguish a success stRte from a fRilure state); second, when it is 
assumed by the members that some characteristic or ability is instrumental 
to success or failure at the task (e.g., the determination of the task 
outcome is not simply a matter of chance); third, when the members of the 
group are oriented to a collective outcome (i.e., it is necesary and 
leg~ timate to take each others' behavior into account), and finally, when 
all the members are equal in terms of external statuses such as age, sex, 
education, race, etc. 
Given these conditions, Berger and his colleagues assumed that 
individuals who begin as equals, in the course of collectively solving their 
group task develop differences in underlying (and unobservable) 
performance expectations for self and other. Performance expectations 
are stabilized anticipations of future task performances, and are based on 
evaluations of past behavior which the actor makes for self and which he 
can communicate through re~o~ard actions to the other. Hence, what is 
happening as expectations form is that evaluations and re~o~ard actions of 
specific past behaviors are giving rise to generalized anticipations of 
future behavior. 
Once formed, such performance expectations are assumed to determine 
subsequent power and prestige behaviors. Thus, for exa~ple, if A is 
interacting Hith B, and A and 8 both have formed high expectations for A 
and low for B then He can expect that: A will initiate more performance 
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outputs to B than wi.ll B to A, B will give A more action opportunities than 
A will give to B, B is more likely to communicate positive reactions to A's 
performance than A is to ll' s, and B is more lil<ely to be influenced by A 
than A is by B.* Therefore, by this theoretical account, the 
intercorrelation of the various components of the power and prestige order 
is explained by the fact that they are all functions of the same 
underlying expectation-states structure, and so are related to each other 
in a systematic fashion. 
Working within the framework of this general formulation of the theory 
of emergence, Fisek (1968, 1974) constructed a Markov chain model to 
describe this process as it occurs in initially undifferentiated 
three-person groups. Testing his model in a study of 59 such groups engaged 
in open interaction, Fisek found (unexpectedly) that in half of his groups 
there existed., already at the outset of their interaction, differentiation 
in participation, while in the remaining half participation rates were 
initially undifferentiated and only became differentiated through time. 
Since they were outside the scope of his formulation, Fisek did not apply 
his model to the initially differentiated groups. (These groups, however, 
have led to an interest in other processes involved in the formation of 
expectation states, see next section, and work on cues described in Section 
v/// 
*This basic status distinction, from the standpoint of behavioral 
differentiation, produces a "performer" "reactor" division. The predicted 
behavior for A is basically that of the performer who is initiating 
problem-solving attempts at a high rate, while the predicted behavior for 
B is basically that of the reactor Hho is giving A chances to perform, being 
influenced by A, and reacting to A's performances (Berger, 1960). 
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VID,· beloH. l Applying his morlel to the initially undifferentiaterl groups, 
Fisek found that it did in fact predict the emer<1;ence of po;rer and prestige 
orders, in particular, the differenti<'ltion Hhich develops in member 
participation, and the differentiation Hhich develops in the pair-Hise 
interchanges bet;~een the group actors. 
Extending the Theory of Emergence. Building on earliet formulations, 
Ber[\er and Conner ( 1974) extended the theory for the emergence of po•,;er and 
prestige orders. The key assumption in this extended formulation is that 
the differences in performance expectations that develop in status equal /' 
tasl< groups are based on differences in the rates at Hhich individuals have 
their performi'lnce outputs (problem-solving attempts) accepterl by others. 
This argument generalizes previous formulations (including the evaluation 
expectation state models described beloH) Hhich locate the emergence process 
in differential evaluations of unit performances. 1:/hile this factor does 
lead to differences in the rates at which performance outputs are 8Ccepted, 
other factors may also have this effect, e.g., individuals may differ in 
interactive skills, or they may differ in the degree to Hhich they are 
influenced by others. The extended theory specifies conditions under which 
such initial differences are sufficient to produce inequalities in accepted 
performances and ultimately differentiated performance expectations. 
Berger and Conner also show that the differences in poHer and prestige 
behaviors, Hhich are functions of differentiated expectations states, in 
turn will lead to continuing differences in the rates at Hhich performance 
outputs are 8ccepted. Thus, the very behaviors which are functions of 
expectation states also operate to mainti'lin these states, and as a 
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consequence the group's observable power and prestige order canes to 
be stable. By this arr,u~ent ~ajor changes i.n the power and prestige order 
will not occur unless they are determined by (1) the presence of some 
exogenous factor, e.g., evaluations of the group product by an external 
source, or by (2) a change in the initial conditions of group action, e.g., 
with the passage of time, the group becomes more process-oriented and 
therefore less task-focussed (see Heinicke and Bales, 1953). 
Abstracting the Evaluation Expectation States Process. A key feature of 
the earliest theories on the emergence of power and prestige orders is the 
idea that expectations can arise out of the differential evaluations an / 
an actor makes of unit performances which he also communicates via reward 
actions to the other (Berger, 195R). This process, developed in the context 
of these theories is in fact highly general and can be applied to other 
kinds of social phenomena. Through a set of successive theoretical 
statements, expectation state theorists have abstracted this process from the 
power and prestige theories for study in its own right (Berger and Snell, 
1961; Conner, 1965; Berger, Conner, and McKeown, 1969, Fararo, 1973). 
There have been two experimental investigations, under high controlled 
conditions, of the general evaluation expectations theory. In these 
experiments, subjects worked jointly at the task of deciding the correct 
solution to a repeated, binary choice decision-making problem. On each 
tri2l there existed a perceivable "correct" choice and at the same time 
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there was sufficient ambiguity to create uncertainty.* Each subject made 
a private initial choice, exchanged information about this choice with the 
other, and then made a private final choice. The subject's communication 
was controlled by the experimenter and in these experiments they found 
themselves in almost continual disagreement on the decision-making choices. 
To represent the process in this particular situation a model t.Jhich 
is a three-state absorbing Markov chain version of the general process has 
been constructed (see Kemeny and Snell, 1960). Tt is assumed that subjects 
start in a state in which there are no defined expectations for self and 
others. Because they must resolve disagreements with other to complete the 
task, they differentially evaluate the unit performances of self and other 
and at each decision trial are either influenced by other (accept other's 
performance output) or reject the influence of the other (accept their own 
performance output). As a result, as the process evolves there is the 
likelihood that the individual forms differentiated expectation states, 
"High-Low," or "Low-High" (the other two states of this model). Because 
of the nature of the interaction (almost continual disar,reements), it is 
assumed that once an individual is in one of these differentiated states 
he remains in the state. 
*This is an unusual task condition which is true of these process studies. 
In IJlOSt of the research done in this type of situation, while subjects are 
led to believe that there is a "correct" and "incorrect" choice, the task 
alternatives (in the absence of influence attempts) in fact are equally 
likely to be chosen (see Berger et al., 1977, Chapter III on the nature of 
the standardized experimental situation which is also referred to as "the 
basic expectation states situation"). 
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In the first experiment in this situation and using this model Conner 
( 1965) paired tHo subjects, and each subject's role Has so defined that any 
incorrect decisions he made had feH ne~ative consequences for their partners 
(and so there Has less pressure on the subjP~t to accept the influence of 
the other). On the basis of the observed behavior of his subjects, Conner 
inferred that one type of differentiated state Has formed and that subjects 
moved to a "High LoH" state (Conner, 1965). In the second experiment, 
Berger, Conner, and McKemm ( 1969) pitted one subject against a unanimous 
pair of others, and on the basis of the observed behavior, they inferred 
that, under these conditions, tHo types of differentiated states Here 
formed, "High LoH" and "Lm-1 High." With time an increasing number of 
subjects move from an undifferentiated state to one of the tHo 
differentiated states, and there is a shift in the rates Hith Hhich subjects 
accept or reject influence attempts. 
Aside from describing the detailed process, this model also can be used 
to isolate the factors Hhich effect this process. At present He believe 
(based on these experiments and research in other parts of the program) that 
the likelihood that individuals in this situation form differentiated 
expectation states and move to one or other type of state depends primarily 
on structural factors, and on the properties of the interaction process and 
group task. Among the structural factors, probably the most important is 
the individual's role in the group Hhich defines the potential gains and 
costs involved in his accepting or rejecting influence attempts (see section 
IVD beloH on decision-making behavior). As for the features of the 
interaction process and task, a crucial one is the ease or difficulty, 
inherent in the task, of making differential evaluations of decision-making 
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alternatives. This factor is important because it effects the very 
likelihood that in a particular situation Fm evaluation expectation process 
actually will be set in motion. 
In the work described so far the evaluations have been integral aspects 
of the individual's interaction. ~owever, "objective" evaluations from 
j/ 
external sources can also play a crucial role in creating and changing 
expectation states. Foschi (1968; 1971; 1971; 1972a; 1972b; Foschi and 
Foschi, 1972; 1976) has studied the process of formation of expectation 
states as a consequence of objective evaluations, i.e., feedback from the 
experimenter about the subject's choices. Foschi began her work by studying 
the effects of specific performance evaluations that contradicted already 
formed expectation states. She found that changes in expectation state 
corresponded directly to the number and severity of the contradictions 
between unit-evaluations and expectation state. l~ore recently, Foschi has 
constructed a Bayesian model of the formation of expectation states which 
assumes that a frequency distribution of different kinds of 
unit-evaluations, determines a distribution of corresponding kinds of 
expectation states, a model of which permits one to specify threshold values 
for the proportion of consistent evaluations required for the subject to 
become certain of a given expectation state and for the proportion of 
inconsistent evaluations required before a change of state will occur. 
''lithin the last few years there has been a limited amount of research 
in this branch of the program (see Conner, 1977 and Foschi and Foschi, 
1979). However, recently Conner (forthcoming) has elaborated further the 
extended theory on the emergence of power and prestige orders, has 8pplied 
it to the growing body of research on task cues (see section VID below), and 
has developed formalized models to investigate some of its most important 
features. 
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IV. Early Proliferants of Expectation-States Theory 
A. Status Characteristics and Expectation States* 
The purpose of the earliest proliferant of the expectation-states 
theory was to explain how and under ~mat circumstances initial status 
differences determine the distribution of power and prestiee in 
problem-solving groups, The small groups literature of the 1950s had 
provided numerous examples in which externally created status differences 
determined the observed power and prestige order: Torrance (1954), for 
example, had found that air force rank determined influence in both intact 
and reconstituted air crews even when rank had nothing at all to do with 
the crew's task; Caudill (1958) had found that even the most active nurses 
were less active than even the least active residents in hospital ward 
*In this section we restrict this review to just the theoretical work on 
the status characteristics theory. However, it is important to note that 
there has also developed a body of application and intervention research 
which is based on the status characteristic theory. For examples of this 
applied research where the application is to~ as a status 
characteristic see Lockheed and Hall (1976), Meeker and Weitzel-O'Neill 
(1977), Lockheed (forthcoming), Ridgeway (1982), and Foschi and Plecash 
(1983); where the application is to~ see Cohen (1972), Cohen and 
Roper (1972), and Lohman (1972); where the application is to ethnic 
identities and differences, see Cohen and Sharan (1976), Rosenholtz and 
Cohen (forthcoming), and Yuchtman-Yaar and Semyonov (1979); where the 
application is to physical attractiveness as a status characteristic, 
see Webster and Driskell (1978, 1983); and where the application is to 
reputed differences in reading ability in classroom situations s~e 
Tarnrnivarra (1982) and Rosenholtz (1977). 
15 
~ 
rounds; Strodtbeck, James, and Hawkins (1958)' had found that both sex and 
occupation determined choice of a foreman, participation rates and influence 
in mock juries. Similar results had been reported in over a dozen studies. 
(For a review of these see B. P. Cohen et al., 1972.) The most notable 
findings of these investigations were, first, how many different kinds of 
characteristics all produced this effect and, second, that the findings did 
not depend on whether or not these characteristics were associated with the 
task of the group. To provide a theoretical explanation of this 
generalization became the goal of a new branch of the expectation states 
program referred to as the theory of status characteristics and 
expectation states. 
The initial formulation of this theory (Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch, 
1966) incorporated many ideas from the original power-prestige formulation. 
It made use of the idea of an expectation-state, the idea of an observed 
power-prestige order, and the assumption that expectation states both 
determine and are maintained by power-prestige behavior. The emergence of 
an expectation state, however, involved not differences in unit evaluations 
of behavior but initial status differentiation. Initial status 
differentiation was thought of as the possession of distinct states of a 
diffuse status characteristic (such as male versus female, white 
versus black, educated versus uneducated, etc.). Associated with these 
states are invidious social evaluations (in terms of differences in honor, 
respect, esteem, etc.) and both specific expectations (capacities to 
perform specified tasks, such as math problems, mechanical tasks, etc.) and 
general expectations (capacities which are not defined with respect to 
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specified tasks such as "intellir,ence").* There is substantial evidence, 
for-example, that sex, race, and physical attractiveness nre particular 
instances of this kind of status characteristic in the United States at the 
present time. (See Berger, Rosenholtz, and Zelditch, 1930). The emergence 
of expectation states in a specific situation that involves initial 
differences in a diffuse status characteristic depends on three kinds of 
assumptions. First, the diffuse status characteristic must be activated ~-
(or become salient), that is the expectations associated with it must he 
attributed to specific individuals, which the theory assumes 11ill occur if 
actors face a collective, valued task, the task involves some specific task 
char~cteristic instrumental to success, and the actors are differentiated 
by the diffuse status characteristic. Second, it is assumed that, once ~-
V 
activated, a diffuse status characteristic will be assumed to be relevant 
to performance on the immediate task confronting the actors unless it is 
specifically dissociated from it. That is, if nothing precludes status 
characteristics from being relevant, actors will act as if they are 
*The concept of diffuse status characteristic (and for that matter, specific 
status characteristics, or status-clusters) is an abstract theoretical 
notion ;mich must be distinguished from specific and concrete status :1 
distinctions such as sex, race, etc., which may or may not be status 
characteristics in some given society or subculture. Evidence from applied 
research that sex, race, etc. are diffuse status characteristics in any 
particular social system at any particular moment in history is treated as 
"instantiational" evidence, i.e., evidence that the theory does in fact 
apply in a particular society at a particular time. Hence, the results of 
applied research is of vital importance in the use of this theory. See 
below, in section VC; also Berger et al. (1977) on the role of instantiation 
in applying abstract theory. 
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relevant. They act as if the burden of proof lies in showing that 
the status characteristics is not relevant to their task, rather than the 
other way around. Therefore, unless their inapplicability is demonstrated 
or justified, status 'characteristics, and status advantages, Hill as a 
matter of normal interaction be applied to ever new tasks and ever new 
situations. The third major assumption is that if status characteristics //. 
are relevant, actors will form expectation states for self and other 
on the immediate task in such a way that they are consistent with the states 
of the diffuse status characteristics they possess. 
This theory predicts how individuals will be ordered in their observed 
power-prestige behavior by initial status differences. This ordering (as 
opposed to numerical values) does not depend on Hhether or not the status 
characteristic initially is relevant or irrelevant to the task, nor on how 
much or little status information is given the participants provided they 
are initially differentiated. (See Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch, 1972.) Two 
direct tests of these implications have been carried out. Both use a 
standardized experimental setting similar to that used to test theories in 
the power-prestige branch of the program. The major difference is in the 
manipulation of initial status differences. In these studies status 
differences were manipulated by isolating subjects and informing each that 
one of the two has the state x of the diffuse status characteristic while 
their partner has the state y , where either x > y or x < y • Subjects 
were so chosen that all of them have the state x Hence, the subjects 
were alike in educational attainment or rank (which were the status 
characteristics involved in these studies), and therefore, no differences 
found in the experiment can be attributed to actual differ·ences in 
ability, dispositions etc., associated with status. Each subject believed 
that the other subject is higher or lower in status, depending on the value 
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given.to y • Thus, in Berger et al., 1972, all subjects were air force 
staff sergeants. Half believed their partner was an air force captain, half 
believed:that their partner was an airman )rd-class. In the first case, 
the experiment created a low-high status condition; in the second ca.se, the 
experiment created a high-low status condition. 
This experiment found that if the experimenter also informed the 
subject that the other had a higher or lower Army General Classification 
Test score than the subject and that these scores were relevant to the task 
they were jointly performing, then the subject was significantly more likely 
to defer to the views of a captain than an airman 3rd class. If the 
experimenter informed the subject that the other had higher or lower AGCT 
scores but said nothing about the relevance of these scores to the task the 
effect was somewhat weaker but the order was the same and the differences 
were still ·significant. Even if the experimenter said nothing at all about 
differences in AGCT scores but informed the subject only that his partner 
was a captain or airman 3rd class, statistically significant differences 
were obtained. Similar results are reported by Moore (1968), who used 
educational attainment as a status characteristic. That is, he used 
subjects from a junior college who believed their partner was either a 
high-school student or a university student. In half the cases, he also 
made the status characteristic explicitly relevant to the task, in half he 
did not. The status characteristic significantly ordered the subjects• 
power and prestige position in both cases. 
This initial formulation of the theory of status characteristics was 
restricted to the effect of a single status characteristic because it was 
not clear at the time how to formulate the relation between two or more 
status characteristics, particularly for the case in which these 
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characteristics were inconsistently allocated--the classic problem of 
"status inconsistency." Aft:or considerable exploration of this issue, the 
initial theory was reformulated to take into account multiple-as well as 
single status characteristics and specific as well as diffuse status 
characteristics (Berger and Fisek, 1974). 
This second theoretical formulation, hoHever, t<as still restricted in 
scope to just two interactants. * It Has rapidly follm;ed by a further 
extension to both more actors and more kinds of actors, referents as well 
as interactants (Berger, Fisek, Norman, and Zelditch, 1977). 
These successive reformulations introduced basically four net< V" 
theoretical ideas. First, the original theory was extended to include 
*The concern with interactants, i.e., actors directly interacting with 
each other to accomplish a collective purpose, leaves out a wide range of 
other kinds of roles, such as referents (objects of orientation whose 
characteristics play a role in the meanings given to actions by 
interactants), noninteracting self-observers (actors reD.ectin~ on and 
interpreting their own behavior as interactants in the task situation), 
audiences (noninteractants present as the interaction is taking place), 
and sources of evaluation (noninteractants Hhose evaluations matter 
to interactants). Each of these roles is important in expectation states 
theory. The current version of the status characteristics theory describes 
the effect of referents on interactants, and in the next section we will 
describe a theory of sources of evaluation. Describing the effects of 
audiences on interactants, and the relations of an actor's b"!havior as an 
interactant to his behavior as a noninteracting self observer remain tasks 
for the future. 
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specific as well as diffuse status characteristics, and in addition, status 
clusters--combinations of interrelated status characteristics. Second, 
v/ 
differences in the strength of a characteristic's effect were given a 
precise meaning in terms of different paths of relevance between a status 
characteristic and a task outcome. A status characteristic might be 
directly relevant, indirectly relevant, or not initially relevant. Through 
spread of relevance, more paths form as actors process available status 
information and use it to structure particular situations. Such connections 
form between elements not only through connections to other status 
characteristics but also goal-objects (objects with symbolic value as 
rewards) and referent actors. Third, actors were permitted to move back / 
and forth between interactant and referent roles, a process through which 
the status structure of a group was seen to gradually evolve in such a way 
that, if the same task and interaction conditions were preserved so also 
was the earlier evolution of the structure, each subsequent elaboration 
being founded on that part of the structure already created, Fourth, it 
was assumed by these subsequent reformulations that all salient (or 
activated) status information, whether consistent or inconsistent, is 
combined in forming aggregated expectation states. The actor processes 
inconsistent status information in accord with what is called the 
principle of organized subsets: he first organizes it into consistently 
evaluated subsets and only then combines these subsets. Furthermore, it 
is assumed that as the actor organizes information within consistently 
evaluated subsets there is a diminishing effect in adding each increment 
v 
of status information. This principle implies that the combined effect of 
many status elements is not simply the sum of their individual effects. 
v 
Even more, it implies that if there are, for example, different numbers of 
status elements in the two inconsistent subsets the small subset will havey/ 
a disproportionately large effect on the resultant power-prestige order. 
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Theoretical Research. Theoretical tests of the reforMulated versions of 
the st<Jtus characteristic theory have been concerned 1-1i th four major 
problems. First, what are the conditions under 1-ihich status infonnation 
/" 
is activated (or becomes salient) for actors in their immediate situtation? 
In general, the research supports the theoretical arguments of the status 
theory that status characteristics become salient if they are a basis of 
discrimination betHeen actors or if they are believed to be connecterl to 
the r,roup's task (as in the cultural belief, for example, that men are more 
mechanical then HOmen) , Kervin ( 1975), 'ilebster and Berger ( 1975), <md 
Webster (1977). Second, what is the effect on the 8ctors' poHer and 
prestige of different types of paths of relevance (paths of status v 
expectancy) connecting the status characteristics actors possess to their 
task? There is research which fully supports the idea that the shorter (and 
therefore more strongly task-connected) the path of status expectancy the 
more extreme (higher or lower) is the actor's power and prestige position 
(Kervin, 1972, Zelditch et al., 1930). However, there also are experiments 
Hhich provide only partial support for this idea (Moore, 1968, Berger et 
al., 1972). In addition, there is research \.Jhich fully supports the idea 
that the greater the numbers of paths of expectancy (holding constant path 
strength) linking the actor to the tasl< the higher (or lower) is the actor's 
p01;er and prestige position, Kervin (1972), Berger, Fisek, and Freese 
(1976). (For additional research on paths of status expectancies, see 
Wagner and Berger, 1982.) Third, Hhat evidence exists that particular 
v 
stRtus characteristics are indeed governed by the burden-of-proof process, 
i.e., that they generalize to nonrelevant tasks? At present, evidence 
exists for the operation of the burden-of-proof process for the follm;ing 
diffuse status characteristics: educational attainment, '1oore ( 1963); 
Zeller and tlarneke ( 1973), Zeldi tch et al. ( 1930); military rank, Berger 
et al. ( 1972); ar,e, Freese and Cohen ( 1973); ~· Hebs':er and Driskell 
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(1978); and~· Pugh and Wahrman (1983). Evidence also exists for the 
operation of the burden-of-proof process in the case of single specific 
status char~cteristics; Kervin (1975), and multiple specific status 
characteristics, Freese and Cohen (1973), Freese (1974, 1976), and Parcel 
and Cook (1977) . And finally, the fourth major problem addressed in this /" 
research has been concerned with the question of how are multiple status 
characteristics processed by actors? Overall, the results of the existing 
research support the arguments of the current status theory that the 
information from all status characteristics, which have become salient, 
is combined by the actors, and that contradictory information is not 
"ignored," "simplified," or "balanced," Berger and Fisek (1970), Berger et 
al. (1970), Tress (1971), Kervin (1972, 1975), !'reese (.1974, 1976), Zelditch 
et al. (1980). Some evidence does exist in support of a "simplication" 
or "balancing" hypothesis in the research of Freese and Cohen (1973). 
However, a partial replication of this study provides clear support for the 
combining argument, Webster and Driskell (1978). Of the most recent work 
on this problem, there is research by Martinet al. (1978), and Hembroff 
(1982), purporting to show that there are status situations in which both 
balancing and combining occur, while at the same time there is research by 
Knottnerus and Greenstein (1981), Pugh and Wahrman (1983), Markovsky et al. 
(1983), and Wagner and Ford (1983) which provides still further evidence 
in support of combining. Thus, while we already know much more about 
behavior in inconsistent status situations than we did even ten years ago,,/' 
research is still continuing which is aimed at testing and refining our 
current status theories.* 
* For additional research which involves theoretical extensions and 
refinements of the status characteristics theory, see Kervin, 1977; Fox 
and Moore, 1979; Humphreys and Berger, 1981; Skvoretz, 1981, and 
Skvoretz (forthcoming). 
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B. Sources of Self-Other Evaluations 
The power-prestige branch of expectation-states theory finds the 
emergence of expectation states in the process of interaction. The status 
characteristics branch finds them arising from a diverse set of elements 
including prior institutionalized beliefs about classes of people. A third 
way in 1.tlich expectation-states states arise is, as Cooley argued, through 
reflections of others' appraisals, particularly the appraisals of 
"significant" others. Cooley located such significant others primarily in y 
families and peers but there are individuals who have the right to 
evaluate the performance of others in many kinds of more formal settings 
as well; employers have the right to evaluate employees, teachers the right 
to evaluate students. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to suppose that such 
evaluations affect the expectations for future performance of those being 
evaluated. But it is also clearly the case that individuals who have the 
right to evaluate another do not always affect the expectations and behavior 
of the others. What, then, are the circumstances under which the right to 
evaluate does affect expectations and behavior? The branch of the 
expectation states program that addresses these questions is called the 
theory of sources of self-other evaluations. 
Webster (1969), in the initial formulation of source theory, considered 
the simplest possible situation first--one in which a single evaluator (an 
individual with the right to evaluate) assesses the performance of two other 
actors. In Webster's formulation this evaluator is said to be also a 
source for the actors if his evaluations of their performances do in fact 
matter for them in the situation, which is the meaning the theory gives to 
being a "significant" other. Webster's key assumption addresses the 
question of what effects the likelihood that the evaluator of an actor also 
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becomes the source for the actor. His main argument is that the higher the 
expectations an actor holds for the evaluator, the more likely is the 
evaluator to become a source for the actor. Three·basic propositions then 
constitute the essential ideas of the theory. First, given that the 
v 
evaluator is a source for the actor, p, the actor's evaluations of his own 
and other's, o's, performances will be determined by the evaluations made 
by the source. For example, if the source has evaluated p's performance 
negatively and o's performance positively, then p will evaluate his own 
performance negatively and o's performance positively. Second, the 
expectations that an actor has for self and other will be determined by / 
these unit evaluations. Thus, if p has consistently evaluated his own 
performances negatively and o's positively, then p will develop low 
expectations of performance for self relative to o. Finally, the actor's ~ 
behavior will be a function of his expectation state relative to the other. 
Hence, if p's expectations are low relative too, p will'defer more 
frequently to o when they disagree than he would if his expectations were 
high relative to o. It follows from this formulation that p's 
power-prestige position relative to o will be highest when he receives 
positive evaluations from an evaluator for whom he has high expectations 
and lowest when he receives negative evaluations from an evaluator for whom 
he has high expectations. Intermediate power and prestige positions result 
when p receives either positive or negative evaluations from an evaluator 
for whom he has low expectations. 
This initial formulation was tested and supported by the results of 
an experiment conducted by Webster (1969), and almost immediately was 
extended to the case in which the actor's expectation states for a source 
are affected by the status-characteristics possessed by the evaluator 
(Webster, 1970). Given that an activated status characteristic will affect 
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the actor's expectations for the evaluator, it follows directly from the 
assumptions of source theory that a hieh-status evaluator, is more likely 
to become a source for the actor than a low-status evaluator, even ,though 
the two are equated in that they both have the right to evaluate that 
actor. 
One implication of Webster's original theory (particularly significant 
in the study of organizational processes) is that there is some positive 
probability of an evaluator becoming a source purely by virtue of his / 
structural position even when an actor's expectations for the evaluator 
are low. Webster and Sobieszek (1974) tested this implication against the 
rival hypothesis that an evaluator for whom an actor has low expectations 
becomes a negative source, i.e., actually leads the actor to expectations 
opposite in sign to the evaluations made by the source, Their results 
supported the original implications of the theory, with little evidence from 
this study supporting the idea of a negative source. 
The first attempt at a theory of multiple evaluators was by Sobieszek 
(1970). In the key assumption of her formulation, which deals with the case 
of two evaluators becoming sources for the actor and conflicting in their 
evaluations of his performances, Sobieszek argued that the actor simply 
ignores this contradictcry information when it occurs, making~ 
evaluations of self or other, While the data of Sobieszek's first 
experiment supported this, a number of alternative arguments, consistent 
with her findings, could not be ruled out. Sobieszek and Webster (1973) 
returned to this issue to consider the hypothesis that the actor may use 
evaluative information from both of two conflicting sources rather than 
ignore such information; and in an ingenious study they succeeded in 
providing evidence that the evaluations of conflicting sources are 
combined rather than ignored. For further research on the combining 
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of evaluations from conflicting sources see also Webster, Roberts, and 
Sobieszek (1972). 
Webster and Sobieszek (1974) refined and coordinated the results of 
investigations of source theory up to that date, encompassing multiple 
sources and diffuse status characteristics and using a combining mechanism 
(distribution of evaluations among sources) to deal with conflicting 
sources. Although no new theoretical formulation of source theory has been 
developed since 1974, it continues to be an active area of research, 
Crundall and Foddy (198i), and it also continues to be important in the 
development of new branches of expectation states theory, see Moore 
(forthcoming). 
C. Distributive Justice and the Status-Value of Rewards 
A common feature of status situations is that rewards are allocated 
to actors on the basis of the different kinds of task or status criteria 
present in them. In such cases, actors will form not only task and status 
but also reward expectations for themselves and others and these reward 
expectations raise questions of obvious theoretical importance: How do 
reward expectations emerge and how are they related to task and status 
expectations? How are they related to actual allocations of rewards? What ~ 
happens if the actual allocation of rewards violates expectations? 
The last two of these questions dominate the literature on "equity" 
or "distributive justice" (see, especially, Adams, 1963; Adams, 1965; 
Homans, 1961, 1974; Walster, Berschied, and Walster, 1973, 1978), 
and it is these questions that initially gave rise to a branch of 
expectation states theory concerned with distributive justice (Berger, 
Zelditch, Anderson, Cohen, 1968, 1972). 
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The distributive justice branch of expe·ctation states theory was 
originally concerned with the justice of actual allocations of rewards and 
how individuals respond to injustice. But it differed from Adams 
in formulating these questions from a status value point of view. 
and Homans ~ 
v 
That 
is, it was concerned with the status rather than consummatory or exchange 
value of objects, hence focussed on the symbolic value of what it called 
"goal-objects."* It was, for example, concerned with why small differences 
in wages and salary could mean so much to some people, with the significance 
of apparently meaningless objects like corner offices, Bigelow rugs, and the 
key to the executive washroom, and with the way in which status 
charactteristics like ages, sex, and race--treated as "investments" in 
Homans (1961, 1974)--played such a large role in defining the value of 
goal objects as well as how they should be allocated. What turned out in 
the end to be its most important idea was that the status value of goal 
objects and expectations for their allocation are determined both by an ./ 
v 
externally given, collectively validated frame of reference called a 
referential structure, and the particular conditions in an immediate 
situation of action, called the "local" system. 
A referential structure, in this formulation, consists of: (1) valued 
social characteristics which are defined as being associated with goal 
*The choice of terms was intended to avoid certain implications of the term 
"reward": (1) reward often connotes positive value but in a status value 
theory negative as well as positive values are important; (2) reward often 
connotes psychological notions such as reinforcement which are to be 
distinguished from its status value aspects, and (3) reward often connotes 
direct gratification for the person, whereas the emphasis here is the status 
or "honorific" significance of the goal object. 
28 
~ 
objects of a particular kind; (2) the valued goal objects that are 
associated with the different states of the social characteristic; and (3) 
generalized actors to whom these valued characteristics and goal objects 
are attributed. An example of such a structure is the belief, where held, 
that managers, say, in comparison with blue collar workers, possess higher 
levels of educational attainment, and that levels of educational attainment 
are associated with salary levels. Note that this structure does not 
consist in normative claims that because they have such educational 
attainments managers deserve higher salaries. Referential structures, 
as conceived in this theory, are in the first instance beliefs about what 
is, not what ought to be. However, under certain conditions such 
structures come to define the moral expectations for rewards, as well 
as their status value, in the immediate situation of action, the local 
system. This occurs if the referential structure is unitary (each state 
of the social characteristic in it is associated with a unique level of 
reward), balanced (goal objects and associated states of status 
characteristics are consistent in status value), and differentiated (the 
structure defines the association across both higher and lower levels). 
Because such referential structures are shared and socially validated 
social facts they are capable of defining the meaning of particular local 
systems. Through the similarity of elements of the local system to various 
parts of the referential structure, an actor comes to understand the status 
value of "people like me" and the immediate other with whom he compares 
himself, as well as the status value of the goal objects that are available. 
Similarly, the actor comes to understand what "people like me" and the 
immediate other typically get, therefore, wh2t the actor himself and the 
other have a right to expect in the particular case. "Justice" and 
"injustice" are relations between such expectations involving the actor and 
29 
... 
the linmediate other and the actual allocation of goal objects in the local 
system. Like other theories of distributive justice, this theory assumes 
that injustice gives rise to pressures to change the local system. 
The status-value theory was originally formulated as an alternative 
to exchange theories of distributive justice, and this has carried over to 
tests of the theory. This theory differs in important ways from the 
theories of Homans, Adams, or Walster et al. Among these is the focus on 
the status value aspects of distributive justice rather than consummatory ~~ 
or exchange value aspects, and the focus on referential and local 
c~~parisons, rather than purely local comparisons. 
The differences in these theories in how comparison is conceived makes 
a particularly large difference in how justice and injustice are conceived. 
In the original exchange theories, an actor A is seen as comparing the ratio 
of his inputs to outcomes with the input/outcome ratio of a second actor B. 
If the ratios are equal, the allocation of outcomes is equitable--outcomes 
are proportional to inputs. If the ratios are unequal, something about the 
situation is inequitable and pressure exists either to increase inputs or 
decrease outcomes if someone is overrewarded or decrease inputs or increase 
outcomes if someone is underrewarded. However, in terms of the status-value 
theory one cannot determine whether individual ~has been over-, under-, 
or even justly rewarded from the evidence of B's inputs/outcomes alone. 
If, for example, the ratio of A's inputs/outcomes is greater than B's, all 
the following are logically possible: A is justly rewarded, B is 
underrewarded; A is overrewarded, B is justly rewarded; or A is 
overrewarded, B is underrewarded. If the ratios are equal, furthermore, 
it is still logically possible that both are justly rewarded, both are 
overrewarded, or both are underrewarded. By invoking comparison processes 
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that relate referential structures to local situations of action, the 
status value theory enables us to clearly disting~ish different states of ~ 
injustice: (1) the states involving overreward from those involving 
underreward; (2) the states involving self injustice from those involving 
other injustice; and most importantly, (3) the states involving collective 
injustice from those involving individual injustice. 
The ideas on collective versus individual injustice were used by 
Webster and ~~ith, 1978, in studying the role of justice in the formation 
of revolutionary coalitions, i.e., combinations of actors whose purpose is 
to reallocate goal objects. Contrasting predictions based on equity theory 
with predictions based on status value theory, their findings supported the 
latter. 
Another way in which status theory differed from equity theory was that 
it predicts the existence of a "reverse process"--a process which is the 
reverse of that in which the formation of re~mrd expectations results from 
the possession of valued social characteristics. Tf actors in a task 
situation know that goal objects are allocated on the basis of a status 
characteristic which is, say, some performance characteristic, C, but do 
not know (or are in doubt of) what state they have of the characteristic 
they possess, then allocation of goal objects will create expectations for 
the possession of states of the characteristic consistent with the allocated 
goal objects. These expectations in turn will determine the actor's 
behaviors. The reverse process has been investigated by Cook, 1970 and 
1975, Parcel and Cook, 1977, and Harrod, 1980. All show that allocating 
goal objects differentially gives rise to expectations consistent with the ~· 
goal objects, and these expectations are manifested by their effects on the 
actor's behavior. 
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The importance of socially validated referential structures in 
determining re11ard expectations in nonexperimental populations, and hence 
beliefs of Hhat one justly has a right to expect, has been sturlied by 
ingenious survey methods developed by Rossi. Jasso and Rossi (1977) and 
Alves and Rossi (197R) asked survey respondents to evaluate the justice of 
a series of vignettes relating income levels to characteristics like family 
status, occupation, and sex, Their results shoHed a hir,h level of 
consensus over the standards to be applied in assessing the distribution 
of earned income. Their most important finding, from the point of view of 
later advances, was that multiple referential structures have a combined 
effect in determining reward expectations. This makes the extension of the 
original theory, which was restricted to the operation of referential 
structures, one at a time, comparatively straightfon;ard. Out of this work, 
also, has grown a variant of the status value theory, formulated by Jasso 
(1978; 1980), that has a number of features in common with it hut is 
founded on a logarithmic "justice evaluation function" that concisely 
expresses the findint~ that people react more to under- than to over-reHard. 
(For further research which involves theoretical extensions of the originnl 
status value theory, see Donnenworth and Tornblom, 1975, and Tornblom, 
1977.) 
Status value theory has been concerned with how justice and different 
types of injustice is ~iven meaning in situations of immediate action. 
Central to this concern has been the prior question of how reward 
expectations are formed. The most recent developments have addressed this 
issue: hm; are reHard expectations formed given multiple referentinl 
structures, and how they are related to status and task expectations? This 
more recent rlevelopment is described belm1 in section VIC. 
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D. Decision-t~aking Processes 
While this is one of the oldest branches of the expectation states 
program, it differs in significant ways from other branches. Important 
theoretical ideas, which are common to the different parts of the program, 
are either less developed or completely absent. For example, neither the 
idea of an "expectation states process" nor of expectations states as 
"situationally stable relational structures" is utilized in the research 
in this branch. In addition, there are concepts which have been developed 
in this branch that are not easily related to the theoretical "core" of the 
program. (See discussion of the "core" of the program, section V below.) 
The research in this branch has been conditioned by two general 
concerns: First, an interest in the effects of variations in structural v/ 
conditions on behavior in the basic expectation situation, e.g., the 
effects of different levels of decision-making control in the group; and 
second, an interest in developing decision-making models to represent the 
effects of structural variations on the individual's behavior. >fuile 
interrelated, the results of these research interests, in fact, are quite 
distinct. 
The decision-making model used in this branch was first constructed 
by Camilleri and Berger (1967). It argued that an actor's choice behavior 
is a function of the "gains" associated with the given choice in relation 
to the totality of gains represented by the set of all available choices. 
The "gain" of a choice is defined as consisting of the positive elements 
associated with the choice plus the negative elements avoided in the 
foregone alternative choices (see Homans, 1961; Festinger, 1957). These 
positive and negative elements are weighted by the probabilities associated 
with their occurrence. Information that is related to the actor's 
expectations is used to make estimates of the values of these probabilities. 
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This is a general model which i~ applicable to a wide range of 
decision-making situations (see ~lcMahon and Camilleri, 1975, where it is 
used to describe member participation behavior in an entirely different kind 
of situation). The basic structure of this model has remained unchanged 
since its initial formulation, although it has undergone a series of 
modifications in order to fit new experimental results (see Balkwell, 1969, 
1976, Camilleri and Conner, 1976, Shelley, 1972). Host recently, Lindenberg 
(1981) has presented a general "discrimination model," which he argues is 
"deeper" than the original decision-making model in that it can specify the 
conditions under which the original model holds.* 
On the substantive level, the research in this branch has been 
concerned with the effects of variations in structural conditions on 
v' 
behavior in the basic expectation situation: the effects of variations in 
decision-making control (see Camilleri and Berger, 1967; Balkwell, 1976), 
the effects of variations in group size (see Camilleri and Conner, 1976), 
and the effects of variations in rewards that are contingent on individual 
performance (see Shelley, 1972). Clearly the most basic result that has 
emerged from this research is the finding that there exists in inverse 
relation between an individual's level of control over the group's decision 
and the likelihood that he is influenced by his partner on that decision. 
*The Lindenberg model was first developed by Siegel and r~ldstein (1959), 
and Siegel et al. (1964), and subsequently was theoretically elaborated 
by Lynne Roberts Ofshe as reported in L. Ofshe (1967). Her first tests of 
her model are reported in L. Ofshe (1968), and further tests and extensions 
are reported in L. Ofshe and R. Ofshe (1970). The current Lindenberg 
"general discrimination model" in turn represents a further elaboration of 
the Roberts-Siegel model. 
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The individual with complete control over the group's decision, i.e., where 
he alone makes that final decision for the group, is ~ influenced than 
the individual who shares control with his partner, and he in turn is more 
influenced than the individual who has no control over the group's final 
decision, i.e., where his role is that of an "advisor." This 
"control-influenceability" relation holds for two- and three-person groups, 
Camilleri and Conner (1976), and it holds for individuals in different 
self-other states, Camilleri and Berger (1967). What is still to be done 
is to determine, in a fully general way, the conditions under which this 
inverse relation does or does not hold for different group contexts. 
E. Authority and Expectation States 
An experiment by Evan and Zelditch (1961) was concerned with the 
erosion of authority in professional organization, one in which competence 
is the justification of authority, as expectation states of subordinates 
change from relatively "high" to "low." This experiment found that 
authority attributed to positions in the structure worked like status ~/ 
characteristics, creating initial expectations of performance capacity. 
Incongruence between expectation states and authority of position did not 
affect the legitimacy of authority of position, but it did modestly decrease 
levels of compliance with direct commands about how to perform the task of 
the organization. However, the effect of expectation states on compliance 
was less than one would expect to find if only expectation states determined 
observed power-prestige behavior. This suggests that expectation states 
and authority of position combine to produce the observed level of 
compliance. Incongruence between expectation state and authority of 
position had no effect on compliance with purely administrative commands 
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or on rates of performance. The latter may have been due to the power, 
rather than legitimate authority, of the position (which could, of course, 
affect hiring and firing). 
Berger ·and Zelditch (1962) modelled this process as an expectation-
states process. Modelling the rate of change in expectation states by which 
incongruence between expectation state and authority is produced led to the 
conclusion that the extent of formalization of the authority structure 
(specifically, the scope of the rules) is inversely correlated with the rate 
of change in expectation states (Zelditch, 1972), The more rules there are, ~ 
the less likely incongruence is to arise in the first place. 
However, no subsequent research has (to date) appeared on this model. 
It requires a quite different experimental setting, and work on reworking 
the setting was unsatisfactory. The development of the program was 
therefore arrested without it ever getting off the ground. 
An Overview of the Growth of the Program 
In sections III and IV we have described the proliferation of six 
branches of expectation-states theory, the original seed of which was a 
theory to explain in expectation-states terms the differentiation in power 
and prestige in initially undifferentiated problem-solving groups. 
The metaphor of a "tree" should not be stretched too far, but it does 
give some idea of the more complex concept of "growth" required to describe 
a theoretical research progrmn. One meaning of "growth" is how rapidly and 
how far any one branch of a program has grown. But another has to do with 
how many different kinds of branches have emerged. 
Perhaps the limits of the metaphor are best seen when one tries to say 
what the "trunk" of the tree is. It is hard to stick to the idea that the 
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oric;inal branch is the trunk of the tree, because looking at the tree as 
a Hhole it is, after a time, merely one among many branches. ·,Jhat more 
:nearly resembles the trunk is not itself palpable at ~ll: There is 
obviously, nevertheless, a "core" of concepts, propositions, methods and 
directives that relates the diverse branches to each other and is common 
to them. 
It is this core, indeed, which underlies the proliferation of the 
program. That is, it is these core elements Hhich are abstracted from the 
earlier branches and extended to neH domains. The earliest proliferant of 
expectation-states theory, status-characteristics theory, conceived of the 
inequalities in power and prestige in r,roups 1-/hich Here initially 
differentiated in terms of status as involvin~ differentiated expectation 
states in a manner similar to that in initially undifferentiated groups. 
The difference Has in the operation of an external status characteristic 
which in differentiated groups is involved in the formation of expectation 
states at the outset of interaction. ~ence, the problems to be solved were 
to formulate the nature of such external status characteristics, their role 
in the formation of expectation states, and the conditions under Hhich they 
Here "activated." Thus, at the same time that researchers in the original 
power-prestige branch of the program Here formulating more abstre~ctly an 
"evaluation-expectation" process and me~king this process a focus of research 
in its own right, a ne<N and separate branch was emerging that Has concerned 
<Nith social situations in Hhich the formation of expectation states involved 
externally given status characteristics. Once emerged, both branches have 
continued to grow more or less in parallel. 
Not that concepts from the original branch were sole factors in the 
proliferations Hhich have occurred in the program. For once it had emerged, 
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concepts unique to the status characteristics theory have also played a role: 
in some subsequent branches, like the theory of sources of self-evaluation. 
In formulating the nature of the source process, core features of the 
evaluation-expectation process were employed. In formulating the effects 
of status differences on the source process the concept of a diffuse status 
characteristic was combined with the assumptions of source theory (see 
Webster, 1970). 
Nor is the relation between two branches of the program always one-way, 
as it has been in the case of the influence of the power and prestige branch 
on status characteristics theory. In formulating the concept of a 
referential structure, which is conceived as creating the meaning of and 
moral expectancies for social rewards, the justice branch borrowed the 
concept of a status characteristic. But out of the research in the justice 
branch was developed the concept of a "path of relevance" that, in turn, 
has fed back into the subsequent growth of the status characteristics 
branch, materially affecting the generalization of that theory to 
multi-characteristic status situations. 
Finally, it is evident that not all branches develop either at the same 
rate or in the same way. The authority-expectation branch has not evolved 
since its initial formulation in part because it did not solve the problem 
of how to create an appropriate and useful experimental setting for the 
process with which it was concerned. Among those branches that have 
continued to develop after they initially emerged, the predominant pattern 
of development has been the progressive extension of the formulation to more 
and more complex social situations (status characteristics theory, source 
theory). While the original power and prestige branch shows this same 
progressive development, it also exhibits something more--namely, the 
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abstracting and formalizing of a theory of an evaluation-expectation process 
for study in its o;m right. And in the cases of the source and status 
characteristics theories, applied research has played a central role in 
spurring and shaping development that has not yet been described (see 
section VC beloH) but has been of crucial importance, 
Despite the Hays in Hhich empirical reality blurs the metaphor, the 
"core" of the program is both the key to its proliferation and Hhat holds 
it all together. Each of the six branches so far described deals l<i th a 
different phenomenon. In order to address different phenomena, each has 
developed some specific concepts and assumptions not found in other branches 
of the program. But each nevertheless has certain features common to all 
the branches Hhich holds the diverse theories of the program together. 
Before describing some of the more recent developments in expectation-states 
theory ;1e pause, in the next section, to describe some of the central 
features of this "core." 
V. Core Elements of Expectation-States Program 
The core of this theoretical research program consists of three kinds of 
elements: First, common substantive terms and assumptions that are involved 
in its theories, such as conceptions of an expectation state and an 
expectation-states process. Second, common metatheoretical ideas and 
directives that guide the construction of its theories, such as ideas on 
abstract and general theories of social processes, or ideas on the relation 
of theoretical and applied reearch to each other and to the growth of 
theory. Third, common methods of observation and inference, such as the~­
standardized experimental settings used in the program's theoretical 
research and the open-interaction settings used in its applied research. 
39 
'J 
We limit ourselves, for reasons of space, to three of the most 
important of these elements. For further discussion of core elements see 
Berger et al., 1974; 1tlagner, 1978; and Fararo, 1978. 
A. Expectation-States Processes 
Expectation states theories conceptualize social phenomena in process 
terms. Not every conceivable social process, however, is an expectation , 
states process. Expectation-state processes are social processes of a 
particular kind, a kind that we can describe as "state organizing 
processes." In saying that an expectation states process is a "state 
organizing process" we seek to characterize certain features of the strategy 
involved in constructing such theories. 
The first of these is that the unit of analysis of such theories is 
the "situation." This unit of analysis is at once broader and narrower than 
such conventional "levels" as small group, organization, or society. It 
is broader in that a "situation" consists in abstract, general features of 
any kind of concrete system. Elements such as a "task," a "collective 
decision," a "status characteristic," or a "power and prestige order" might 
be found in families, work groups, complex organizations, or small problem-
solving laboratory groups. It is narrower in that it is not the whole of 
a concrete social structure that is characterized by these elements. That 
is, no concrete system is in the same social situation all of the time. 
:·'" 
The analytic elements that make up the situation are present some of the time 
but absent at other times. 
Because of its focus on analytic elements such as "tasks," "collective 
decisions," and more generally on abstractly defined situations within which 
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a social process occurs, expectation states theories cut across the 
"macro-micro" distinction that is so common in sociological theory. This 
does not m.ean that size, distance, complexity, and other properties of 
larger-scale social systems make no difference to how expectation state 
processes work. Even the difference between two and three actors makes a 
profound difference to an expectation states process (cf. Fisek, 19711). 
But in expectation states theory "scale" is treated as an analytic property 
like "task," "collective decision," et al., not as a fundamental difference 
in "level" of theory. 
An important feature of the idea of a state organizing process is that 
it will occur in a situation if certain conditions hold true, which is 
why the relevant social process is not something that is just "always there" 
and why its behavioral manifestations are not always observable. When the 
conditions that lead to a status process are not present in a particular 
family, say, the differentiated power and prestige order generated by the 
status process may not be manifested, and the relations between the family 
members may be, at that time, in fact undifferentiated. More generally, 
a state organizing process is a social process which comes into existence 
when specific social conditions exist in a particular setting whether the 
setting be a group, an organizational context, or an interpersonal 
encounter. For a status process, Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch (1966), see 
these conditions as particular task and status conditions: For a control 
process, Talley and Berger (1983) see these as conditions that describe a 
particular state of disruption in normal interaction: For an interpersonal 
attribution process, Johnston (1977, 1978) sees these as conditions that 
characterize a particular type of breakdown in interpersonal communication. 
But a social process conceived as a "state-organizing process" not only 
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comes into existence (is "activated") given the ilppropriate initial 
conditions: It also "evolves" (develops· a structure which is shaped by the 
specific features of the immediate situation) and, when the initial 
conditions are altered, ·e.g., the group is no longer task-oriented, or the 
actors have dealt with the normative disruption in their social interaction, 
the process terminates (is "deactivated"). From this perspective, state 
organizing processes are latent processes that have the constant ~· 
potentiality of becoming activated given the appropriate conditions in a 
social situation. 
An important feature of a state organizing process is that such a 
process creates expectation states. Here, we are concerned with the role 
of such structures in state-organizing social processes. (Shortly we shall 
examine, in more detail, the nature of this concept as it appears in 
different expectation states theories.) Expectation states are self-other 
relational structures which stably organize behavior among interactants. 
These states arise out of the conditions and behaviors that activate the 
process, and they are created as interactants confront specific situational 
demands. Given an activated status process, for example, self-other 
expectation states are formed and power and prestige behaviors occur, as 
functions of these states, that are responses to the task and status 
conditions that generated the process initially. More generally, they are 
structures that are formed as interactants respond to different types of 
demands whether these be the motivation to solve a group task,,the pressure 
to deal with a normative disruption, or, as in the case of a justice 
process, the pressure to engage in comparative evaluations of actors' 
contributions and rewards. 
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While expectation states, in this view, are "stable relational 
structures," their stability is relative to the specific features of the 
interactive.situation. First, their stability is contingent on the presence /. 
. ' 
of the conditions that generate the social process. If these conditions 
change or the social process itself is completed, these relational 
structures become deactivated like the social process of which they are 
part. Second, the actor's state relations with any given other can change / 
v 
dramatically, depending upon the particular proce$s in which they are 
interacting, e.g., a status process or a control process. Finally, within 
a given process, such as the status process, the same actor can hold any 
one of an almost infinite number of expectation positions in relation to 
others. That is, in going from one situation to a second, he can undergo 
very large or small changes in his expectation advantage depending upon the 
status characteristics of the particular others with whom he interacts (see 
Berger et al., 1977). Thus, in this conception the stability of these 
relational structures, from any given actor's standpoint, depends on whether 
or not a state-organizing process is activated at a particular time, on the 
nature of the particular process that is activated, and on the social 
characteristics of the particular others with whom he is interacting. 
The conception of expectation states processes as state organizing 
processes leads to specific theoretical questions the answers to which 
constitute the expectation states theory of a particular social phenomenon: 
(1) That such processes are conceived of as activated and deactivated 
leads first of all to the question: Under what conditions is the process 
activated? The answer to this question requires conceptualizing the 
situational conditions involved in generating a particular process. The 
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general idea is that particular social conditions are involved in each state 
organizing process--for example, status, justice, or control, and that the 
theoretical task is to formulate in abstract and analytic. terms these 
conditions. 
(2) That such processes are conceived of as governed by relatively 
enduring states leads to the question of: How are the elements that ,· 
constitute such states processed and organized in the operant situation? 
The answer to this question involves formulating theoretical assumptions 
which describe how behavioral or informational inputs are processed by the 
interactants. In Fisek's power and prestige model (1974), for example, 
these are assumptions which describe how expectation relations and rankings 
are formed out of behavioral exchanges. In the status theories these are 
assumptions which describe how status elements become salient, become 
relevant to the situation, and become related to each other. In general, 
the task within a specific theory is to formulate theoretical assumptions 
and principles which describe how a particular process evolves, and how. 
situationally stable states are formed. 
(3) Finally this perspective leads to the question: How is a state, 
/' 
once formed, transformed into state-governed behaviors in the particular 
situation? In the power-prestige and status theories this involves 
assumptions which describe how an interactant's expectation advantage over 
another is translated into his observed power-prestige behavior vis a vis 
the other. In general the task is to formulate, within specific theories, 
assumptions (such as the "basic expectation states" assumption) which relate 
the expectation structures involved in the particular process to the 
observable behaviors of that process. 
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B. The Nature of Expectation States 
Expectation States as Theoretical Constructs .. The concept of an 
"expectation state," which is involved in all the branches of the program 
is central to the idea of an expectation states process. This concept has 
evolved a good deal since the time it was first introduced (in Berger, 1958) 
because it has been "stretched" to fit the needs of various theoretical 
formulations. In the third section below we will look at some of the 
variations in the concept. In this section and the next we describe 
features that have been common to the theories in the program. 
Expectation states are not observable states. The most important ~· 
feature of an expectation state is that it is a theoretical construct (see 
Berger et al., 1962). The role such constructs play in theories is to 
enable the theorist to generalize and integrate, through underlying abstract 
concepts, other concepts that describe otherwise disparate features of a 
process. This mode of theorizing about expectation states is almost as old 
as the program itself and was first rigorously developed in the Berger and 
Snell model, 1961. 
While they are not directly measured, expectation states are inferred. 
Inferences about them are made on the basis of (1) observable antecedent 
conditions (for example, behavioral or informational inputs), (2) observable 
consequences (for example, inequalities in behavior), and (3) theoretical 
specification of the relations between these two kinds of observables and 
unobservable expectation states. The testability of a theory employing 
theoretical constructs rests on theoretical specification of the links 
between them and antecedent and consequent observahles. Three of the most 
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important ideas common to the theories of the program arise out of the way 
these theories specify these links. Here we simply summarize these most 
general theoretical "themes" which are developed (in varying forms) in 
specific theoretical formulations. 
The first of these is the general idea that expectation states drive~­
behavior or that behavior is a function of expectation states. This is 
probably the most common idea in the program, namely, that differences in 
underlying states and structures lead to differences in behavioral 
consequences. In general the consequences that are theoretically linked 
to expectation states are the interactant's observable social behaviors, 
as for example, his power and prestige behaviors.* 
Second, under specifiable conditions, expectation states themselves 
are conceived to be functions of behavioral and/or informational inputs. 
That is, behavioral, and informational inputs to the actor drive ~, 
expectation states, just as expectation states drive behavior. This idea, 
conjoined with the first, argues that there exist conditions that involve 
a "basic duality" between behavior and expectation states, i.e., conditions 
in which behavior determines expectation states and expectation states, in 
turn, determine behavior. This duality is perhaps most explicity specified 
in the power and prestige theories of Fisek (1968, 1974), and Berger and 
*Recently Barchas and her colleagues have also begun to investigate the 
interactant•s physiological responses as additional observable consequences 
of expectation states (see Barchas, 1975; Harris, 1980, 1981). 
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Conner ( 1974), and in the models developed by Conner (·1965), Berger et al. 
(1969), Moore (1969)', and Fararo (1973).* 
Third, if expectation states determine behavior and behavior determines 
expectation states, then it is reasonable to assume that there exist 
conditions in which expectation states and their behavioral consequences, 
once evolved, are maintained. While again these id.eas on the maintenance 
of expectations and the stability of its behavioral consequences are most 
explicitly specified in the theories and models in the power and prestige 
/ 
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branch, they are also tacitly assumed in most other branches of the program. 
Expectation States, Interactants, and Noninteracting Observers. 
Because expectation states are conceptualized as unobservable states and 
are not directly measured, the methods by which expectation state theorists 
identify or assess them differ markedly from more conventional attempts to 
find them in interviews or self reports. In fact, we believe that 
interactants, while engaged in interaction, typically are not aware of nor 
do they consciously reflect on how expectation states are formed, what 
states are formed, or how these states are translated into behavior. The 
processes, for example, by which a mosaic of initially unconnected status 
*This duality does not imply that the relations between behavior and 
expectation states are necessarily symmetrical. In the Markov chain model 
constructed by Berger et al. (1969), for example, we find that while the 
behavior of the interactant at time n is a probabilistic function of his 
expectation state at time n, his expectation state at time n is a 
probabilistic function of both his behavior and his expectation state at 
time n - 1. 
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elemen~s prorluces a resultant status order is, in all lil<elihood, largely 
outside the individual's awareness. 
In the perspective of expectation states theory, the interactant is 
capable of and engages in information processing activities which can be 
quite complex. The assumptions of different theories describe these 
activities. In the status characteristic theories (Gerger, Cohen, and 
Zelditch, 1966; Berger, Fisek, Norman, and Zelditch, 1<)17), for example, 
there are "activation" and "salience" assu'!lptions which describe how items 
of information (beliefs about self and other, beliefs associated with status 
characteristics, etc.) become inputs to the status process, while in 
Fisek' s model ( 1974), Gerger, Conner, and McKeown model ( 1 G69), and Gerger 
and Conner's theory (1974), there are ass~ptions which describe how 
different types of behaviors (performance outputs, disagreements, exercized 
influence, etc.) become inputs to an expectation formation process. Also 
in the current version of the status theory there are information processing 
principles that describe how the interactant operates on different types 
of complex status structures (of almost an infinite variety) in forming 
aggregated expectation states. In short, we believe that the actor's 
be!'lavior, while the actor is in the role of an interactant, is governed by ,.----
complex information processing principles, which are described by the 
assu'!lptions in expectation state theories. At the same time we do not think 
of these as being consciously guided processes, or processes that the actor 
monitors, or processes that the actor may even be aware of. 
But 11hatever, in fact, be the nature of and role of "awareness" in 
these matters, the important point is that current expectation state 
theories in general make no ass~ptions, Hhich are formal parts of these 
theories, that relate the formation of the interactant's expectation states 
to his conscious processes. Specifically, they make no assumptions about 
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the relation between the way an actor forms expectation states and engages 
in behavior and the way in which he reflects about his expectation states 
and his behaviors.* 
In expectation states research a sharp distinction is made between the 
interactant, the actor who is directly engaged in the interacting process, 
and the noninteracting observer of that interaction, the actor, who is ~~ 
reflecting on what has taken place in it, interpreting and making sense of 
it.** Post-session interviews, for example, are conceived by expectation 
states theorists to put the respondent in the role of a noninteracting 
observer of his own behavior. The two roles function in quite different 
social situations, involving different tasks, different inputs, and 
different processes governing their behavior. Expectation states, inputs 
to these states, and behavioral functions of these states in current 
theories, are conceptualized from the standpoint of the interactant and not 
from the standpoint of the noninteracting observer interpreting his own 
behavior after the fact. As a consequence, productions of the actor as a 
noninteracting observer (such as his post-session interview) cannot, from 
a theoretical point of view, be used to identify his expectation state as 
* 
** 
While the actor's self-interpretative and self-reflective statements are not 
used to measure his expectation state for the reasons which we describe 
here, such information does have heuristic value and often is so used by 
expectation state researchers in developing their theoretical principles 
about expectation states and processes. 
One of the original sources of this distinction is the very common 
observation among expectation state researchers that subject's post 
experimental reports on their behavior (for example, on how many 
"S-responses" they made) may bear very little relation to their actual 
behavior as it occurred in the standardized experimental situation. For 
similar findings in the Asch situation, see Asch, 1955. As a consequence, 
we have long expressed the view, in lectures and discussions, that different 
principles are required to understand the individual's interpretation of 
his experimental experiences, as a reflecting observer in a post-
experimental interview, than are required to explain his behavior as an 
actor in the experimental situation. 
49 
~ 
interactant.* By making such an identification the researcher risks the 
errors that are involved in making theoretically unwarranted inferences. 
In addition, he obscures an important theoretical problem in all 
interactionist theory, na~ely, that of relating the cognitive productions· 
of individuals in their role of noninteracting observers to their behaviors. 
and states in their role of interactants. 
Variable Features of the Concept of an Expectation State. Up to this 
point we have considered some of the common features of the expectation 
states concept. What about the variations in this concept as it appears in 
different parts of the program? These variations, which we shall briefly 
examine, are both of a substantive and formal nature. 
Because different expectation state theories are concerned with 
different phenomena, the specific theoretical elements that are involved 
*In fact, it is of considerable importance to distinguish findings that bear 
on the behavior of noninteracting observers from those that bear on 
interactants. In a study by Fisek and Ofshe (1970), for example, they found 
that there was consensus in sociometric rankings among individuals who were 
members of a group in which there was behavioral differentiation throughout 
their task session, while there was no such consensus among individuals who 
were members of a group in which differentiation emerged during the session. 
This is a finding about noninteractant observers reporting on their own 
behaviors. Presumably the more uniform and consistent the behavior they 
are reporting on, the greater agreement in their observations. Identifying 
this properly as a finding about noninteractant observers (as opposed to 
interactants) helps us better to understand the relations between the 
social constructions of individuals as observers and their behaviors and 
states as interactants. 
50 
~ 
in the concept of an expectation state also differ in these theories. Tn 
the power and prestige theories the concept is formulated in terms of the 
task characteristics instrumental to the group_' s task; while in the 
status characteristics theory its formulation makes use of a wide range 
of status elements including diffuse and specific status 
characteristics, and status clusters. In the status-value theory it is 
formulated in terms of reward expectations based on the features of an 
activated referential structure and the properties of a local system. In 
one of the newer branches of the program (see discussion of ,Johnston's 
research below) expectation states are formulated in terms of oersonality 
characteristics; and in a second of these newer branches, the concept of 
expectation states also involves moral characteristics as elements (see 
discussion of Driskell's research below). These differences reflect the 
different substantive concerns of these theories and the different concepts 
they have developed to address these concerns. 
The exact formulation of the expectation states concept in the 
different theories also reflects the different formal structures within 
which these theories are interpreted. At one extreme we find the concept 
developed as part of a theory that has little in the way of a formal 
apparatus as is the case in the evaluation and social control theory of 
Talley and Berger (1983). At the other extreme, it appears in theories that 
have well developed formal structures: Self-other expectation states have 
been interpreted as the states of finite Markov chains (Berger and Snell, 
1961; Berger, Conner, McKeown, 1969; Fararo, 1973); patterns or 
arrangements of expectation relations also have been treated as 
51 
~ 
mathematical elements in a still different kind of Markovian model (Fisek, 
1974); and self-other states have also been treated as components of a 
Bayesian decision-making model (Foschi and Foschi, 1976, 1979). While the 
expectation state concepts within these theories share common conceptual 
features and play similar roles, the differences in formal structure affect 
the kinds of theoretical distinctions that can be made and the theoretical 
subtleties that can be captured by these concepts. This can be seen more 
easily, perhaps, by briefly examining some of the formal elements that are 
part of the conceptualization of expectation states in the latest version 
of the status characteristics theory. 
Within this latest status theory, the notion of an expectancy bond (a 
"relevance relation") and a path of status expectancy (a "path of 
relevance") are explicitly defined. These paths may be positive or negative 
to distinguish expectancies for goal success from those of goal failure. 
These paths also differ in terms of their length and their degree of task 
relevance. This enables us to distinguish different kinds of expectancies 
in terms of the goal-attainment strength that they each embody. The 
assumptions of the theory describe how a structure of status expectancies 
emerges in a specific situation where each expectancy is "weighted" by its 
associated degree of task relevance. An expectation state (for self or 
others) in this formulation is a particular type of aggregation of these 
weighted expectancies. This aggregation is generated from the structure 
of weighted expectancies in accord with the information processing 
principles specified in the theory, i.e., the principle of "organized 
subsets." The mathematical structure of this theory enables us to describe 
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expectation states formed in very simple status structures (those containing: 
few expectancies) or very complex status structures (those containing many 
expectancies), consistent status structures (where all the actors' 
expectancies are associated with the same goal state) or inconsistent status 
structures (where some associate him with one goal state and others to an 
oppositely evaluated goal state), and in homogeneous status structures 
(where expectancies are of the same kind with equal relevance to the goal) 
or heterogeneous status structures (where they are of different kinds with 
different goal relevancies). Thus, as this example illustrates, the nature 
of the expectation states concept (its meaning) and its power (what can be 
done with it) is shaped by the formal language of the theory. 
C. The Relation Between Theory, Tests, and Applications 
"Expectation-states theory" as a program is built up out of three kinds 
of components: First, it consists in abstract, general theories, i.e., 
v 
theories the terms of which are such ideal generalizations as "diffuse 
status characteristics," "specific status characteristics," "unitary, 
collective tasks," "action opportunities," "performance outputs," etc. 
Second, it consists of a body of controlled, experimental tests of these 
theories, in situations that realize as far as it is technically possible ~ 
the abstract conditions regarded as necessary to test the theory. Third, 
it consists of a body of applied research, research designed to discover 
and identify different specific social characteristics in concrete, 
particular settings and to intervene to alter their more undesirable 
effects. (For reviews of this applied research, see Berger et al., 1980; 
E. G. Cohen , 1982) • 
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The relations among these components are conditioned by three 
metatheoretical directives common to all the branches of the program. The 
first follows directly from the logic of the relation between theories and 
their application: Theories are general, they refer to abstract elements 
such as "diffuse" or "specific status characteristics" in the status 
characteristics theory. Applications of the status theory involve 
particular, concrete elements such as race, sex, or ethnicity. To apply 
a theory such as the status characteristics theory, therefore, requires 
statements asserting that such concrete entities as race, sex, or ethnicity 
are instances of the abstract elements that theory defines as a status 
characteristic. This means that to apply status characteristics theory 
requires evidence that race or sex or ethnicity are differentially valued 
characteristics the states of which are associated with specific and general 
expectations. Such "instantiating" statements can be true or false: Race 
or sex or ethnicity might be status characteristics in Boston but not in 
Mexico City in 1982 but not in 2082. But if an instantiation is false, one 
does not say that the theory is false, one says that the theory does not 
apply to this instance. From this it follows that instantiational 
assertions are not statements in the theory, they are part of a distinct 
body of applied knowledge. Hence, applied research is necessary in order 
to relate the abstract theory to the different concrete realities. It is 
by virtue of such research that one accounts for status organizing effects 
for particular cases and in particular situations, and describes how these 
effects can be modified. In this sense, abstract theory is grounded by 
applications. 
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But it is also true that applied research, and actual applications and 
interventions, contribute in crucial ways to the growth and development of 
theory. They do this in part by suggesting new problems: Both their k 
successes and failures contribute to growth, the former because 
interventions sometimes succeed in ways.the theory does not explain, the 
latter because applications scmetimes fail in ways that cannot be explained 
by challenging instantiational assertions or questioning the scope 
conditions of the application/intervention. Thus, in some ways E. G. 
Cohen's application of status characteristics theory to biracial interaction 
is an almost textbook case in which, first, a theory was constructed (Berger 
et al., 1966), then it was subjected to theoretical tests (Moore, 1968; 
Berger et al., 1972), then it was applied to biracial work-groups (E. G. 
Cohen, 1971). E. G. Cohen and Roper (1972) subsequently took this theory 
into account in developing a successful intervention to reduce black/white 
differences in observed power-prestige. But it is important to note that 
they ran ahead of the pace set by development of the theory and ended by 
driving the theory forward. Their method was to introduce contradictory 
performance information into racially defined situations. This raised 
questions about multicharacteristic status situations that were outside the 
scope of the initial status characteristics formulation, posing a 
"theoretical problem" that, combined with other pressures (including the 
purely theoretical one of generalizing the theory), led to the extension 
of the initial status characteristics theory to more complex 
multicharacteristic, status situations (see Berger and Fisek, 1974). 
In general, the issues arising from application and intervention research 
generate theoretical problems whose solutions actually shape the specific 
forms of theory development in the ~rogram. Thus, the first directive 
governing the relations among theory, theoretical research and applied 
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research in the expectation states program is that: theory is grounded in 
applications and applications shape theory. 
The second directive follm1s from the nature of theoretical research / 
as expectation states theory conceives it. Theoretical research, in 
contrast to spplied research, is research with a generalizing strategy (see 
Berger, Zelditch, and Anderson, 1972). Its purpose is to test, refine, and 
extend a theory; its method is to isolate and abstract theoretically 
relevant aspects of concrete, natural settings and study them under highly 
controlled conditions. Hence, it mirrors theoretical processes, not natural 
settings. In fact, it does not describe any natural setting at all. (This 
is as true of nonexperimental as experimental theoretical research.) The 
whole strategy with Hhich one approaches such resenrch is quite different 
in basic orientation than is, for exa~ple, applied research. The strategy 
of generalizing research is governed by the primary objective of providing y/~ 
relevant information about theoretical procE>sses. In this context "relevant 
information" is information which can be used to test, refine, and extend 
theoretical formulations. Research settings are chosen because they are 
instrumental to the theorist's prim2ry objective, i.e., they can be 
manipulated, they can be controlled, effects within them can be magnified 
(if necessary), and they can be measured. Applied research, on the other 
hand, chooses settings because of their social importance, or for other 
reasons in Hhich the setting itself is of paramount importance. Theoretical 
research will therefore often use settings and techniques that appear 
special and contrived and irrelevant from the perspective of applied 
research, and th'! question that will often arise is: how do you get from 
such artificial and concretely very different settings to applications and 
interventions. The directive that the expectation states program derives 
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from its "generalizing" orientation is that: it is theoretical research 
that one uses to test, refine, and extend theory; and it is theory tha.t 
one applies to natural settings. 
From the nature of·applied research and its differences from theory 
and theoretical research, one derives the triadic structure of the 
components of a theoretical research program that, in lectures and more 
informal occasions (if not actually in print) we have colloquially referred 
to as the "holy triangle." Differences in the strategy of theoretical and 
applied research give them somewhat different roles to play in the growth 
and development of theory, but the traditional conception that a theory is 
assessed primarily (even exclusively) with reference to criteria of 
theoretical research or that intrinsic to the objectives of abstract theory 
(generality, testability, confirmation status, relative superiority over 
other theories) is incomplete. A theory may be general, testable, 
well-confirmed, superior to alternative theories but still forgotten because 
its applies to only very special social situations, or it describes a 
process that is so sensitive to competing processes or boundary conditions 
that it is difficult to detect in concrete settings, or the theory offers 
no usable or effective way of manipulating the process it describes to 
accomplish desired interventions. All these criteria arise from 
applications and interventions, not theoretical research. Our third 
directive accepts the fact that the assessment of theory in a research 
v 
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program is a more ca~plex problem than is traditionally recognized. It 
argues that: theory assessment rests on multiple kinds of criteria 
including those involved in applications and interventions, as well as those 
involved in theoretical research and in the objectives of developing 
abstract theory. 
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VI. Current Directions in the Progra'll 
In this section we return to the description of the proliferation of 
expectRtion-states theory, focussing this ti-ne on more recent developments. 
Among the newer domains to which the concepts, assumptions, and methods of 
expectation states theory have been extended, are: First, other bases 
for forming expectation states. These include ( 1) "status cues," items of 
information or behavior from which individuals fo\m underlying status or 
task expectations (Berger, Ridge;my, Rosenholtz, and Webster, forthcoming); 
(2) the expectations of others who interilct with self, what rAOore (1983), 
and !~oore (forthcoming) calls "second order" expectations; (3) "standards" 
that affect the rate at which unit-evaluations give rise to expectation 
states (Foschi, 1981); and (4) information from referential structures from 
t<hich individuals form revmrd expectations (Berger, Fisek, tlorman, and 
Wagner, 1983). Second, oth2r kinds valued characteristics from which 
individuals form expectation states. Tnese include: (1) personality 
characteristics (Johnston, 1977, 1978); (2) moral characteristics (Driskell, 
1932; 'tlebster, 1982); and third, other kinds of social processes. Here, 
Talley and Berger (19~3) have begun to investigate the process of 
interpersonal social control as a state organizing process. And fourt~, 
how status processes relate to other processes. Here, Berger and Webster 
( 1979), Shelley ( 1979), 'tlattendorf ( 1979), and 1!/ebster ( 1980) have begun 
to study how sentiment processes relate to status processes. 
Because there are a fairly large nunber of new domains to which 
expectation states theory has been extended, we have selected four for brief 
description here. These t;ere selected because they illustrate very 
different stages of development: The theory of personality characteristics, 
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described in section (a) of this section, is at·a fairly advanced stage of 
development. This branch exhibits an explicit ~heory, well-worked out 
methods of observation and inference, and several tests on the basis of 
which elaboration has begun. The theory of moral characteristics, described 
in section (b) is less well advanced. This branch exhibits an explicit 
theory, and has worked out a method of observation and inference, but 
empirical investigation is only just beginning. The theory of re;mrd· 
expectations, described in section (c) is even less advanced. This branch 
has an explicit theory, it is capable of being tested in the standardized 
experimental setting used in most expectation states theory work, but it 
does not as yet have a method of observing reward allocation aspects of the 
observable processes. The least advanced branch is the study of status and 
task cues: This branch, described in section (d) is in a stage of theory 
construction. No theory has been fully formulated, but nevertheless, there 
are several promising lines of work opened up by the problem that suggest 
it is a fruitful line of development. 
A. Personality Characteristics as Expectation States 
A common problem in applied sociology is the "rigidity" of the 
complementary interaction of husbands wives, fathers and sons, sisters and 
brothers. Although it is common to conceive of this rigidity as explained 
by certain kinds of "personality traits," this explanation has difficulty 
explaining inconsistency across situations of the "traits" employed to 
accomplish the explanation. "Trait" psychologies typically assume them to 
grow out of socialization experiences, to become enduring features of the 
person--real traits-- and hence also to be "deep" and "consistent," i.e., 
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CJS oper8ting independent of the situation, or the specific other, or the 
conditions of the interaction in Iillich the individual is involved. The 
particular situation, the nature of the relation in which the person is 
located, the specific conditions of interaction are in this kind of 
exptan8tion neglected CJS significant factors and the explanation is located 
entirely in the "personality" of the individual. The rigidity of some 
f8mily interactions, p8rticularly in pathological settings, and the 
difficulty in changing such inter'lctions in family therapy is 
~;ell-documented (Sager and Kaplan, 1972; ~1artin, 197fi). Rut the rigidity 
of the personalities in such families is often found to be "flexible" in 
other kinds of situations: The passive, ineffectual father ;iho is dominated 
by a controlling Hife is dominant, aggressive at ;;ork; the excessively good 
child is provocative and hostile in school. Such cross-situatio~al 
inconsistency of behavior is difficult to explain purely in terms of 
personality traits and intrapsychic dynamics (r·lischel, l'Jfi9). 
Johnston (1~77; 1978) has formulated an alternative explanation in 
'"hich personal attributes are conceived of as elements in an expectation 
states process, Traits such as shyness, outgoingness, hostility, timidity, 
warmth, permissiveness, are treated as outcomes of recurrent interactions 
among the same individuals, who become the basis for their activation. Like 
status characteristics, such personal attributes are thought of as socially 
co~structed beliefs of what people will be like in future situations. Like 
them, personal attributes can be specific (sexuality) or diffuse (morality). 
In f8ct, they d1ffer from status characteristics only in their terms of 
reference: they refer to individuals (rather than classes of individuals) 
and are activated by individuals. 
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This interpretation accounts for the stability of interp~rsonal 
behovior patt<"rns betHeen the sac:Je individu8ls in the same Hay that it 
accounts for stability of po;~er-prestige orders once they have e!'1erged, 
essentially ns the outcome of an expectation states process. It accounts 
for inconsistency of the individual's interpersonal behavior across 
situations in terms of conditions of activation: Behavior'll "traits" Rre 
not part of the individual in any "deep" sense, rather they are reactivated 
by interacting '<lith the s8ffie individuals under the same recurring 
conditions. Alter these conditions and different behavioral traits emerge. 
In Johnston's vieu, a second import;mt condition require·~ to acti vatc, 
behavioral "traits" is the a'llbiguity of the situation, i.e., the absence 
of veridical, external sources of definition of the situation. This 
increases the likelihood that individuals use internal sources of 
definition, i.e., prior beliefs about the person. 
Testing such arguments under controlled conditions required a ne1; 
experimental setting, details of 11hich can be found in Johnston, 1(1713. The 
essential feature of the setting created by Johnston is that subjects 
communicate verbally about a "design" they are jointly creating but are 
separilted by partitions so that they cannot see each other. Hence, they 
:nust fall back completely on 1.Jhat is communicated, Hhich can be made more 
or less 'Jtllbiguous. Johnston found that as the amount of critical 
information in a messa<se decreased, the effect of prior beliefs about the 
personal attributes of the other increased (.Johnston, 1978 and 1<),~0). A 
second method of creatins different levels of <Jmbiguity 11as to present to 
subjects videotaped segments of counselinr; intervieHs, requiring them to 
decide hoH to treat the confederate on the tape, in 1hich the verbal and 
nonverbal cues \Jere either congruent or incongruent Hi th each other. 
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Johnston foun~ that prior beliefs had a strong effect·on the interpr0.tations 
of incone;ruent situcitions. .Johnston also found that prior beliefs about 
personal ai:tributes had an effect in situations that Here basically 
congruent Hith this effect dependin." upon h011 con"ruent the situation uas. 
The more congruent the situation, which presu~ably means that there is less 
ambi(luous co'!lmunication, the less the ~ffect of the subject's prior belief 
on his interpretations· (Johnston, 1930). 
THo inforrr1ation processino; principles formulated in the theory of 
status characteristics and expectation states are found to be ~l.so true in 
the processing of personal attributes. One of these is the "strength of 
relevance" assumption: Hhile Johnston ( 197q) found that specific personal 
attributes, which are explicitly relevant in the situation, have a rsreater 
effect than diffuse attributes, which are initicllly nonrelevant, these 
nonrelevant diffuse attributes also exert a strong and significant effect 
on the subject's behavior. (See also Berger et al., 1977; 1lumphrey and 
Rerger, 192-1.) The other is the "combining" assumption: ~1eyer and 
Jo'lnston, 1930 found that given ambir,uous '!lessages, 1-hen subjects are given 
inconsistent information about personal attributes of the other (that she 
is "outgoing," "excitable, 11 nnd 11 enjoys people," r.md is also "quiet, n· 
"shy," and "keeps to herself") t'lis information is CO'llbined in deternininr, 
the subject's re8ction to the other. Jahnston, 1980, found that 
inconsistency betHeen verbal and nonverbill channels of communication also 
resulted in subject's combining available information--in fact, information 
about personal attributes, information from the content of speech, and 
information fror'l the nonverbal cues given off by the confederate ;~as all 
used in determining the subject's behavior. Furthermore, the specific Hay 
in vmich this information is combined follows the aggre~aterl expectation 
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assumption of the status characteristic theory: ltlhen the information 
provided is consistent, less weight is given to an additional piece of 
information that is conr,ruent than one Hhich is incongruent. 
There is, of course, a great deal left to be done. Among the more 
,, 
important unsolved problems of this branch of expectation states theory is / 
that of describing the process of the emergence of personality 
attributes. With respect to this problem Berger and Talley (1983) have 
suggested the "possibility that various kinds of characteristics emerge out 
of distinct social processes: characteristics having to do Hith performance 
dimensions out of status processes, characteristics having to do Hith moral 
dimensions out of an evaluation social control process, and characteristics 
having to do Hith emotional dimensions out of affect and sentiment 
processes. Each of these is in itself a situationally specific, relational 
process. The possibility exists, however, that each has, as one of its 
resultants,·transituational consequences that are activated by the presence 
of the same specific other in different situations. Thus, it is specific 
relations between individuals Hhich gives the process its stability; while 
its variability across situations depends in part on the shifting 
composition of individuals. 
B. Moral Characteristics :J 
The "poHer and prestige" branch of expect8tion states theory Hi'IS 
originally concerned Hith performance characteristics in t8sk-oriented 
groups. In extending the concepts of this branch to status characteristics, 
hoHever, it Has assumed from the outset that such characteristics Here 
63 
associated with moral as well as performance characteristics--Hith 
characteristics like honesty, responsibility, and fairness as well as 
characteristics like mathe'llatical ability, meaning insight ability, and 
contrast sensitivity. But moral characteristics were not explicitly defined 
nor treated in any differentiated 1-1ay by the status characteristics branch 
of expectation states theory. They were left in an essentially 
pretheoretical state of development. More recently, 11ork has begun on the 
task of developing this concept and relating it to others in expectation 
states theory. 
The most important question to be answered in formulating the place 
of moral char<Jcteristics in expectation states theory is Hhether such 
characteristics a~ differentiated from performance characteristics--and ~~ 
if they are, hoH?. One reasonable way to conceive of such characteristics 
is to treat them as like performance characteristics in having two or more 
differentially evaluated states but unlike them in possessing no 
specified performance significance. Honesty, fairness, responsibility may 
be treated as valued states; they presumably do not imply high or low states 
of a specific ability in and of themselves. One may reasonably assume, as 
a Harking hypothesis, that, like performance characteristics, when they are 
directly relevant to conduct they determine the assumptions on which 
individuals base such conduct. For example, in an experiment on the 
prisoner's dilemma, where trustworthiness is knm-m to be an important 
variable (Boyle and Bonacich, 1970), manipulating expectations of 
trustHorthy behavior by the other should signHicantly increase the 
proportion of cooperative responses in the game. But suppose 
trustworthiness or "empathy" varies in a task-oriented group. Is it Cl 
factor in determining, say, the observed power-prestige order? Will it have 
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the same kinds of effects as a non-relevant performance characteristic? 
That a particular moral characteristic is not directly relevant in a task 
situation does not mean Lt will have no effect, of course: Performance 
characteristics that are ·specific to one type of task and that are not 
directly relevant nevertheless generalize, creating expectations for 
performance on still other kinds of tasks (Kervin, 1975). If moral 
characteristics do generalize and are a factor in creating power and // 
prestige structures in task situations, the question then is to determine 
what mechanisms are involved in such a process. 
Driskell (1982) has experimentally investigated this problem. He argues 
that moral characteristics generalize, and can become a factor in v" 
determining the power and prestige order in task situations. He reasons 
that in the absence of contradictory information (and the presence of strong 
task demands) individuals •mo differ in states of moral characteristics will 
act (and be reacted to) as though they also differed in terms of performance 
capacities (a "completion" argument). Driskell found that subjects \·mo were 
experimentally varied on their own and their partner's "empathy" also varied 
on the influence they exerted in task situations. This effect is not a 
strong one, but it is also not negligible. Recently, Webster (1982) has 
proposed a series of experimpnts to extend this research: '.1hat are the 
conditions under which the magnitude of this "moral effect" is increased 
or decreased; and how are moral characteristics combined with consistent 
and inconsistent status characteristics in the formation of expectation 
states. Webster also proposes to pit Driskell's "completion" mechanism 
against a "balancing" mechanism--that task generalization occurs directly 
through the differential evaluations attached to the states of moral 
characteristics, a property moral characteristics shares with performance 
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· characteristics (on this issue of differential evaluations in status 
generalization see also Greenstein and Knottnerus, 1980). 
While the initial theoretical question remains open, progress has been 
made: A procedure for experimentally investigating this problem has been 
developed, and alternative theoretical mechanisms have been formulated. 
Further development depends upon the outcome of current research--in 
particular, on determining how and under what conditions moral elements 
affect the formation of expectation states in problem solving situations. 
C. The Formation of Reward Expectations 
The status value theory of distributive justice, which was described 
in section III-C, is largely concerned with the "justice" of actual 
allocations of rewards and how individuals respond to injustice. It 
formulates how the meaning of particular situations comes to be defined in 
terms of its relation to a "referential structure," a socially created and 
validated generalized frame of reference. The referential structure, 
together with similarity relations between it and an immediate action 
situation, create reward expectations in the particular situation. The 
relation between these reward expectations and actual allocations of rewards 
generates a justice assessment process. This theory describes the formation 
of reward expectations under relatively simplified conditions; the primary 
focus of the theory is on the meaning of "justice" and its consequences. 
One of the recent developments in expectation-states theory is to isolate 
the problem of the formation of reward expectations and develop this as an 
independent line of work, bringing to bear on this question theoretical 
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ideas from two branches of the program--status characteristics theory and 
the theory of distributive justice. This research, which can be 
distinguished from the original distributive justice research by its shift 
in focus, is concerned with distinguishing different kinds of referential v/ 
structures, with the effect of multiple referential structures on immediate 
task situations, and with the interrelations between re1-1ard expectations 
and status and task expectations. 
'tlorking from the concept previously developed of a "referential 
structure" as a set of beliefs describing hoH the states of a socially 
valued characteristic possessed by individuals are associated with 
differences in reward levels, the more recently developed theory of re1·1ard v/ 
expectations distinguishes different types of such structures. 
Categorical referential structures associate rewards with broad social 
categories, like age, sex, race, or education. Essentially, they invol<e 
criteria of "who you are" in determining the distribution of rewards. 
Ability referential structures associate rewards with specific performance 
characteristics, like mathematical, artistic, or meaning insight ability. 
Essentially, they invoke criteria of "what you ~ do" or "what are your 
capacities" as a bases of allocating rewards. Outcome referential 
structures associate rewards with actual performances and achievements. 
Essentially, they invoke criteria of "what you have done" in the immediate 
situation. Task situations can be distinguished by the pattern of 
different types of referential structures that govern the allocation of 
reHards: From those Hhere only immediate performance counts, to those ;~here 
a combination of ability, immediate performance, and status category count 
and to those where only status category counts (e.g., the "pure" seniority 
situation). The current version of the theory of reHard formations is 
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formulated for status and reward situations in •~ich an ability standard 
is being used (rewards are based on· your task capRcities) and one. or more 
categorical structures (e.g., those based on educational attainment, 
seniority, or sexual status) may become activated as additional bases for 
allocating rewards. 
With respect to such status and reward situations, the reward 
expectation formulation addresses a number of major theoretical questions: 
What are the conditions under which different referential structures ;1ill 
become activated, i.e., become bases of reHard expectancies in the immediate 
situation? If multiple referential structures are activated, hot; are. they 
organized in the situation? !1ow are the status distinctions which exist 
in the situation related to the type of reward expectations that are formed? 
How oan we describe the interrelation of task and reHard expectations in 
the same status situation? Given the actual allocation of rewards in a 
status and reward situation, how is this allocation related to the task 
expectations that are formed and in turn to the actual task performances 
which occur in the situation? 
The reward expectation formulation is a theoretical extension of the 
latest version of the status characteristic theory. In addition to 
introducing concepts and assumptions that are unique to this formulation 
(concepts to describe the different types of referential structures, an 
assumption to describe the activation of such a structure, etc.), it makes 
use of concepts that have been developed in the status characteristics 
theory. For example, the concepts of paths of expectancies (relevance) and 
strength of expectancies are extended to cover reward expectancies as well 
as task expectancies; and the aggregated expectation states assumption is 
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extended so that we can describe the formation, within the same status 
situation, of distinct but related reward and task expectations. The result 
is an abstract theory describing the formation of reward expectations in 
status situations. 
From this theory a set of theorems is derived which provides answers 
to the theoretical questions that have been posed in developing this 
formulation. Among these theorems are the following: (1) Combining 
Referential Structures. Hhich describes the' conditions under which / 
multiple standards are activated and how the information in them is combined 
to create overall reward expectations. (2) Status Consistency and 
Inequality. Which shows how increases in the number of consistent status 
characteristics produces increases in the inequality of reward expectations 
(though at a decreasing rate). (3) Status Inconsistency and Equality. 
Which shows how increases in the inconsistency of status characteristics :/ 
produces decreases in the inequality in reward expectations. (11) Inter-
relation of ReHard and Task Expectations. Which describes the conditions 
in which changes in task expectations (by adding or eliminating relevant 
status distinctions) produces correlated changes in reward expectations, 
and in turn changes in reward expectations (by adding or deleting standards) 
produces correlated changes in task expectations, and therefore actual task 
performances. ( 5) Reward Allocation. '.-lh ich shows how the actual 
allocation of rewards generates task expectancies consistent with these 
reHards, and hoH status characteristics and re1-1ards combine to create 
overall task expectations. 
Some research already exists that is specifically relevant to this 
formulation, and which in general provides support for its theoretical 
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ar[luments. C,ee ':lebster and Smith ( 197SJ) on the role of referential 
structures in creating reHard expecteltions, and Jasso and Rossi ( 1977) ;md 
Alves and Rossi ( 197'l) on the use of multiple referential structures in 
~~erican society as Hell as their combined effort in determining reHard 
expectations. On the interrelation of task and re~;ard expectations, see 
Cook (1975) and Parcel and Cook (1977); and on the generation of task 
expectations as a consequence of re~;ard allocation, see studies by Lerner 
( 1965), Cook ( 1'170, 1975), and Harrod ( i980). 
While the limited evidence available from research specifically 
relevant to this formulation provides support of the ideas in it, the task 
of empirically investigating this theory, in a rigorous manner, is still 
ahead. Provided that the theory is supported by these rigorous tests, the 
theoretical task is to generalize it to other status and reward situations. 
We will "mnt to explain, for example, how outcome referential structures 
are activated, and how they are combined with categorical and ability 
structures to determine the complex rewards standards that govern different 
situations. In addition we want to describe and explain how actual 
performances create new task and reward expectations in situations where 
complex re;mrd standards are operating. 
D. Cues, Expectations, and Behavior 
It is clear that in open interaction situations a wide variety of cues 
are used to form expectation states about self and other: direct references 
to who one is or one's background, how one dresses, hm1 one talks, including 
diction, syntax, accent, tone, how fast one talks, eye gaze, ~onverbal cues 
such as posture, facial expression, how one places one's hands, and many 
others (see in particular Scheflen and Scheflen, 1972; Scheflen, 1q73; 
and Mehrabian, 1972). An obviously important problem in the study of status 
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organizin~ processes is how such cues are used to form expectation states. 
This is something no branch of expectation states theory has so far 
attempted. Thus, we want to extend our theories to sho\1 how a~d Hhat cues 
and cue-clusters are used by individuals to assign to self and other states 
of specific and diffuse status characteristics. The key word here is 
"extend." The pro~ram already has theories relevant to this problem: 
includin~ those in the evaluation-expectation branch, anrl those in the 
status characteristics branch. 
A major problem in relating research on cues to expectation state 
v/ 
theories is to classify the Hide variety of cues i'md cue-clusters into 
theoretically meaningful kinds. To do this flerger, Ridge1-1ay, Rosenholtz, 
and h'ebster (forthcoming) first distinguish in the (very large) existing 
literature indicative cues from expressive cues (the terminology is 
theirs). Cues are "indicative," when they provide an identification of a 
ste1te or condition of the actor by self or other labelling, e.g., "I'm a 
woman," "I'm <1 Black," "l·le' s a Chicano," "He's an Ivy League sturlent, a 
Harvard undergraduate." Cues may be "expressive" as Hhen they exhibit or 
give off signs Hhich are used to identify a state or condition of the actor, 
e.g., the appearance, dress and speech pattern of a Homan, the appearance 
and speech accents of Blacks and Chicanos, and the speech pattern 8nd often 
distinctive dress of the Ivy League undergraduate. This distinction roughly 
corresponds to the verbal, nonverhal distinction. It is important to 
remember that on the basis of extensive previous research, >1e have every 
reason to believe that expressive cues are more poHerful than indicative 
cues (see Mehrabian, 1972). 
Berfler et al. also claim that from the vieHpoint of expectation states 
theory it is useful and important to distinguish task cues from 
categorical cues--a distinction 1<hich crosscuts the indicative expressive 
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one. Task cues provide information that is relevant to the task 
characteristics possess"d by the actors in the situat i.on. .1\mong the most 
important such cues that have been studied (anj that are also expressive) 
are: speech rates, fluency, tone, and eye gaze. Categorical cues provide 
information that is relevant to the status characteristics possessed by the 
actors--in particular, the diffuse status characteristice, e.g., sex, race, 
occupation, educational attainment, etc. Among the most important of these 
cues that have been studied (and are also expressive) are: accent, syntax, 
phonology. 
Ber'ler and his colleagues revie11 som" of the extensive liternture on 
cues Hhich has recently emerged. ConcentratinSi primarily on expressive 
cues--task and categorical--they seek to organize this literature in terms 
of a number of generalizations and principles. These generalizations and 
principles in turn become the objects of research and, more importantly, 
become the basic assertions which have to be accounted for and explained 
by the theories in the expectation states program. 'tie review briefly some 
of the generalizations they have abstracted from this literature. 
Considering first situations where? individuals are homof\eneous "ith 
respect to status characteristics, i.e., do not differ in race, sex, 
educational attainment, or occupational facti. on, etc., <Jerger et al. find 
that for these status homogeneous situations: If individuals differ in 
v/ 
terms of task cues this leads to correlated differentiation in power and 
prestige behaviors and/or assessments of task capacities. (For rate of 
speech see &~ith et al., 1975; for fluency, see Lay and Burron, 1968; for 
tone, see Mehrabian and 14iener, 1')67; for eye gaze, see Rosa and Mazur, 
1979.) Following Conner (forthcoming), B<?rger et al. claim that this 
generalization can be explained by the evaluation expectation states theory. 
Briefly the argum0nt is that differences in task cues lead to differences 
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in unit evalqations of the actors' <lets, differences in rates of received 
·action opportunities, and even differences in the induction of task 
abilities possesserl by the actors. These in turn create differences in task 
expectations and in such power and prestige behaviors as exercized 
influence. 
Berger and his colleagues next consider situations ;mere individuals are 
differentiated in terms of such status characteristics as rae~, sex, 
educational attainment, occupational position. For such situations they 
find that: If individuals are differentiated in terms of status 
characteristics, then their differentiation on task cues Hill coincide 
with their status rlifferentiation (see for example, Terrell et al., 1977, 
McPillan et al., 1977, Exline, Ellyson, and Long, 1q75, and Ellyson, 
Dovidio, Corson, Vinicur, 1980). Berger and his colleagues believe that 
this is a basic empirical generalization which describes what they call 
the status governance of task cues. Further, they argue that if we regard 
task cue behaviors as "outcome" behaviors in the same sense as we regard 
the traditional power and prestige behaviors as outcome behaviors, we can 
explain this generalization by using the status characteristics theory. 
Briefly, differences in status characteristics become the bases of 
differences in expectation states that in turn determine congruent 
differences in task cues. This type of explanation also implies: (1) that: 
changes in the status situation will lead to correlated changes in task cues 
(a causal relation); and (2) that the level of task cue behaviors should 
be a direct function of expectation advantages that are based on status 
differences (a strictly dependent relation). For further discussion of 
these implementations also see Ridgeway et al., 1933. 
Because of the operation of the status zovernance principle, He 
normally expect to find that the distribution of task cues is congruent with 
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the distribution of categorical cues. But Hhat about situations in Hhich 
the distribution of such cues is not congruent, for example, ones in l·lhich 
high task cues are associated Hith individuals •.<hose categorical cues 
signify low status states--l<hat happens in such situations? Examining such 
situations Berger a~d his colleagues find that: If the distribution of 
task cues is incongruent with the distribution of categorical cues, ~/ 
then each set of cues will exert a discernible and significant effect on 
the actor'•s be!'lavior (see, for example, Triandis et al, 1966; '1cCroskey 
and Mehrley, 1069; Miller et al., 197~).* Berger et al. believe that this 
relation also can be explained using status characteristics theory. Briefly 
*The set of results from a recent study hy Lee and Ofshe (1981) is an 
exception to the general findings in this area. In their study Lee and 
Ofshe pitted categorical cues (involving occupatiom~l position) against 
task cues (rate of speech, tone, loudness, gaze, etc. )--which they refer 
to as "styles of behavior" variables. Briefly, Lee and Ofshe find that 
given incongruency of c:~tegorical and task cues, only the latter have an 
effect. There are many features in their procedures that could account 
for thes~ anomalous results. In p3rticular, the fact that these lffiters 
paid no attention to the issue of making conflicting cues equivalent--for 
example, the use of task cues that are expressive and categorical cues that 
are indicative (see above on the relative effectiveness of expressive versus 
indicative cues). This study highlights the pitfalls that are involved in 
tryi.n;:s to make thl'>oretical judgments about the relative effectiveness of 
tasl' versus categorical cues Hhen the issue of making these cues equiv<Jlent 
(on other dimensions) is ignored. See also Berger and Zelditch (1933); 
Nemeth (1983); Sherman (1983). 
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the argUment is that task and categorical cues make task characteristics 
and diffuse status characteristics significant in.the status situation. 
Both sets of characteristics become elements in the actors' self-other 
expectations (via the information processing principles described in the 
status theory); and the actors' behaviors are determined by these self-other 
expectation states. If this reasoning is correct, other things should also 
be true. Controlling for oth"er factors which affect the equivalency of cues 
(multiple versus single cues, expressive versus indicative cues, etc.), in 
these incongruent situations He should also find: (1) that the effects of 
task and categorical cues on the actor's behavior are combined (for evidence 
on this see Miller, 1976, Tuzlak and Moore, 1983); (2) that if task cues 
are pitted against the categorical cues of an initially nonrelevant diffuse 
characteristic, the task cues should show a stronger effect on dependent 
behaviors (this follows from the differences in the "strengths of relevance" 
of the characteristics involved); and (3) under the appropriate conditions 
if task cues are pitted against. categorical cues which are expressions of 
a number of different diffuse status characteristics, we should find 
evidence of inconsistency effects on dependent behavior (this follows from 
the principle of organized subsets). 
Much remains to be done. The theories in the expectation states 
program must not only be able to provide accounts for the major findings 
in this area, they must also be able to generate further implications about 
these phenomena. This they do by their causal predictions, their 
predictions of strict dependency, and by their predictions of relevancy 
effects, and inconsistency effects. The immediate task now is to 
investigate for these particular effects. This will not only provide 
independent tests of these theoretical accounts, it will also provide a 
deeper understanding of how various types of cues are used in the 
structuring of social interaction. 
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VII. 'tlhere Are 'tie? 
Sociologists do not have R great deal of experience assessing the 
development of theor'.etical research programs. Although there are probably 
a number of them in ·sociology and social psychology--for example, Heider's 
theory of structural balance, Davis and Moore's theory of stratification, 
research on distributive justice, m2thematical models of social mobility--we 
do not usually look at them as theoretical research programs and therefore 
lack established criteria by "mich to assess them. Lakatos (1968, 1970) 
tnakes a point of contrasting progressive to degenerating programs, but 
despite its suggestiveness this language is of limited value in trying to 
assess where expectation states theory is at this point in its development. 
Some branches of expectation states theory might be described as "arrested" 
(most notably the authority-expectations branch) ~ile others have been 
progressive (for example, the theory of status characteristics). But what 
can we say about the program as a ~ole? 
Lacking well-established criteria of assessment, we might still fall 
back on describing some of the salient features of the program taken as a 
whole. As suggested in the previous paragraph, the growth of the program 
has been uneven. Some branches never have gotten beyond an initial 
formulation, others have stopped evolving after an initial period of 
development. Even in the case of branches that have shown notable 
cumulative develo~~ent, like the power-prestige, status characteristics, 
or sources of evaluation branches, the fact is that it is too early in the 
history of the program to properly assess their staying power. The program 
is still quite young, most of its work is being carried on by a quite small 
body of researchers, and encompassing either the original founders or their 
students or students of their students. On the other hand, some of its 
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branches have emerged as Hell-established tr<1ditions that continue as active 
and growing lines of Hark Hhich also have proven to be robust and powerful 
when applied. In addition, certain "core" theoretical:and metatheoretical 
"themes" have evolved, such as the notion of an expectation states process, 
and the conception of a particular relationship between abstract theory, 
theoretical research, and applications (the "holy triangle"), Hhich appear 
to be applicable to the study of a wide range of social phenomena. And this 
is perhaps the most important feature of the program that we see at present: 
the development of proliferations of neH and important branches of research 
activity. Finally, we observe that while the pattern of theoretical 
development described in this paper may be unusual in sociological research 
(and may even be frightening to some), nevertheless, \-le believe that it is 
fully in accord with the premise tha~ whatever else .sociology is (and it 
is surely many things), it is also a generalizing science, and as such, 
committed to theoretical growth. 
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